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We study the implications of loss aversion for trade policy determination and show 
how it allows us to explain a number of important and puzzling features of trade 
policy. An important question concerning trade policy is why a disproportionate share 
of protection goes to declining industries. We show that if individuals’ preferences 
exhibit loss aversion, higher protection will be given to sectors in which profitability 
is declining. In addition, by making lobby formation endogenous, we show that an 
industry will be more likely to become organized and lobby for protection if it has a 
loss. We also show that if the coefficient of loss aversion is large enough, there will 
be an anti-trade bias in trade policy. The anti-trade bias refers to the fact that trade 
policy tends to favor import-competing sectors and thus restricts rather than expands 
trade, and is considered an important puzzle in the literature. Our lobby formation 
predictions also reinforce the anti-trade bias result.  
 We use a nonlinear regression procedure to estimate the parameters of the 
model and test its predictions. We find support for the model and the estimates of the 
loss aversion parameters are very close to those obtained by Kahneman and Tversky 
  
(1992) using experimental data. Protection is found to be more responsive to losses 
than to gains, and the estimates of the coefficient of loss aversion are about 2. The 
results are also consistent with diminishing sensitivity to income changes for both 
gains and losses, a prediction that distinguishes loss aversion from risk aversion. In 
order to test some predictions on the lobbying side, we estimate an equation on 
political organization and find evidence of loss aversion in lobby formation. Finally, 
but importantly, we find that the data favors our model over the current leading 
political economy model of trade protection, due to Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 Although economists are usually opposed to protectionism, governments 
continue to use trade policy to protect domestic industries on a widespread basis. In 
recent years, a growing literature on the political economy of trade policy has 
analyzed various motives for protection, but despite some significant developments a 
number of important questions remain. For instance, why is such a disproportionate 
share of protection given to declining industries? The most protected sectors in the 
US and many other countries, such as agriculture, textiles, clothing, footwear and 
steel, are all declining sectors. Similarly, why is trade policy typically biased in favor 
of import-competing sectors and thus restricts rather than expands trade? The anti-
trade bias in trade policy is considered an important puzzle in the literature because 
most existing models do not generate such prediction. The Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) (henceforth GH) model has become the leading political economy model of 
trade protection because, by explicitly modeling government-industry interactions, it 
derives from first principles a set of directly testable predictions about the 
determinants of protection.1 However, it does not explain why protection is usually 
given to industries in which profits and employment are declining, and under some 
neutral assumptions it predicts a pro-trade bias in trade policy. 
                                                 
1 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) were the first to test its 
predictions. 
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 In this dissertation we incorporate individual loss aversion in a political 
economy model to derive and estimate the effects of loss aversion on trade policy 
determination, and show how it allow us to explain a number of important and 
puzzling features of trade policy. According to the pressure-group approach, interest 
groups that spend more on lobbying should, other things equal, receive the most 
government support. Given that we would expect bigger and expanding industries to 
be in a better position to finance lobbying expenditures or provide larger 
contributions, it is paradoxical that a surprising amount of support goes to declining 
sectors.2 This fact provides a motivation for using loss aversion as a natural 
framework that can generate such pronounced asymmetry. The concept of loss 
aversion is due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who provide experimental 
evidence that individuals place a larger welfare weight on the loss of a given amount 
of income than on a gain of the same amount. Empirical estimates of loss aversion are 
typically close to 2, meaning that the disutility of giving something up is twice as 
large as the utility of acquiring it.3 In a model of endogenous protection in which 
individual preferences exhibit loss aversion, we show that higher protection will be 
given to sectors in which profitability is declining. 
 Loss aversion has gained increased recognition in economics as an important 
explanation for several patterns of human behavior and many phenomena that remain 
paradoxes in traditional choice theory, such as the endowment effect (Thaler [1980]) 
                                                 
2 In Section 1.2.1 we review the literature related to this question. 
 
3 See, for instance, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), and Kahneman and Tversky (1992). 
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and the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler [1995]).4 Loss aversion differs 
from risk aversion in that, first, it implies a kink in the utility function and thus 
generates a pronounced asymmetry even for arbitrarily small gains and loses. Second, 
there is diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases 
with their size, and our empirical results also support this prediction. Risk aversion 
does not generate diminishing sensitivity over losses. Third, under loss aversion there 
is reference dependence, and in our model this implies that for two sectors that are 
symmetric in all respects except that one has a loss and the other a gain of similar 
magnitude, the sector that has a loss receives higher protection. A traditional concave 
utility function cannot generate this result, since the level of income is similar in both 
sectors and hence both would get the same protection.5 
 As Rodrik (1995) points out, although a common answer to the question of 
why free trade is so rarely practiced relies on the government’s use of trade policy to 
redistribute income toward specific groups, an equally important puzzle remains: 
Why is this redistribution biased in favor of import competing sectors and therefore 
restricts trade? The anti-trade bias puzzle is particularly relevant for small economies, 
given that they cannot use tariffs to improve their terms of trade. Some political 
economy models of endogenous protection get rid of the puzzle by introducing some 
                                                 
4 Further references and details are provided in the literature review (Section 1.2.3). 
 
5 The same is true if the government has a concern for inequality. Another example of how loss 
aversion generates different predictions for protection is that if we consider a situation in which all 
sectors experience equal losses, the inequality concern motive does not lead to any transfers for them, 
while the loss aversion motive predicts protection for all. 
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artificial assumptions.6 Moreover, the leading political economy model of GH (1994) 
not only cannot explain the anti-trade bias but, in fact, under some symmetry 
assumptions predicts a pro-trade bias (Levy [1999]).  
 We show that if individual preferences exhibit loss aversion and the 
coefficient of loss aversion is large enough, there will be an anti-trade bias in trade 
policy. The intuition is as follows. Starting with two (non-numeraire) sectors that are 
completely symmetric, consider a shock that leads the country to trade both goods, 
such as a shock to the endowments that increases output in one sector and decreases 
output in the other sector by the same amount. The first good becomes the export 
good and the other the import good. Since output is higher in the export than in the 
import-competing sector and protection is proportional to output, this (the “size 
effect”) leads to the tariff being lower than the export subsidy. This is the only effect 
present in the GH model, and thus in that model we get a pro-trade bias. Under loss 
aversion, in contrast, the same shock also leads to a loss for the import-competing 
sector that looms larger than the gain of the export sector and, if the coefficient of 
loss aversion is sufficiently high, this effect (which we call the “loss aversion effect”) 
dominates the size effect and the tariff will be higher than the export subsidy. We 
show that the anti-trade bias also arises between two large countries even if 
cooperation removes the terms-of-trade motive for the use of trade protection.7 
                                                 
6 For instance, the tariff-formation function approach, first used by Findlay and Wellisz (1982), 
assumes that interest groups lobby for tariffs but not export subsidies. Similarly, the political-support 
function approach a la Hillman (1982) assumes that the policymaker wants support from import-
competing interest groups but not from exporting ones. 
 
7 We also show that alternative shocks that lead the country to trade both of the non-numeraire goods 
will generate an anti-trade bias if the coefficient of loss aversion is large enough. In addition, we 
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 We then endogenize lobby formation and show that, for a high enough 
coefficient of loss aversion, 1) an industry will be more likely to become organized 
and lobby for protection if it has a loss, and 2) import competing sectors will be more 
likely to form a lobby than export sectors, reinforcing the anti-trade bias result. The 
intuition for the first result is that the increase in income brought about by protection 
has a larger impact on utility for a sector that experiences a loss, due to loss aversion, 
and the additional protection associated with becoming organized is higher for the 
loser sector as well. This result leads to the second, since if importers lose and 
exporters gain as the country starts trading with the rest of the world (in the absence 
of intervention), the net benefit of forming a lobby will be larger for importers. The 
result is important more generally for the political economy literature, since it can 
apply to the question of why declining industries receive a disproportionate share of 
government support not only in the form of trade protection but also through other 
policy instruments, such as production subsidies, tax breaks, etc. Loss aversion 
provides an explanation for this by implying that losers will have a larger incentive to 
become politically organized. 
 We then study the empirical importance of loss aversion for trade policy. We 
use a nonlinear regression procedure to directly estimate the parameters of the model 
and test its predictions. The results for the US support the model and the loss aversion 
parameter estimates are very close to those obtained by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1992) with experimental data. We find that losses have a larger impact on protection 
than gains, and we estimate the coefficient of loss aversion to be about 2. In addition, 
                                                                                                                                           
provide the condition that must hold for an anti-trade bias when we do not impose any symmetry 
assumptions. 
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we can reject the null hypothesis of no loss aversion against the alternative that the 
coefficient of loss aversion is greater than one. The results are also consistent with 
diminishing sensitivity to income changes for both gains and losses. We also reject 
the null hypothesis that the exponent of the income changes is equal to one. This 
empirical result also provides a contribution to the literature on behavioral economics, 
since diminishing sensitivity in gains and losses is an important distinction between 
loss and risk aversion. To our knowledge, this is the first study that provides 
econometric estimates from non-experimental data of all the parameters of the value 
function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1992).8  
 We incorporate loss aversion in the framework of GH (1994), and given that 
our predictions for protection differ from those of GH, we compare the empirical 
performance of both models and find that the standard information criteria favor our 
model over the GH model. These results contrast with those of Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999), who find that introducing 
additional variables in the estimation of the GH model does not significantly improve 
its explanatory power. Our approach differs from theirs, however, in that we have a 
well-specified alternative hypothesis. In addition, their estimates of the weight that 
the government attaches to political contributions relative to social welfare are 
puzzlingly low and, as Gawande and Krishna (2003) say, “(...) enough to cast doubt 
on the value of viewing trade policy determination through this political economy 
                                                 
8 We know of two papers that estimate the loss aversion coefficient using non-experimental data. 
Putler (1992) estimated separate demand elasticities for increases and decreases in the retail price of 
shell eggs relative to a reference price and obtains a ratio of 2.4. Hardie, Johnson and Fader (1993) 
estimate coefficients of loss aversion for quality in the case of orange juice that are also about 2; 
however, they assume that the value functions are linear and thus do not test for diminishing sensitivity 
and do not estimate the corresponding parameter. 
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lens.” (p.20). Our estimates imply a significantly larger weight on contributions, 
consistent with the common-agency approach’s assumption that protection is “sold”. 
In fact, our estimates imply that most protection is sold and the government attaches a 
very low weight to social welfare. 
 Finally, given that the influence of special interest groups via political 
contributions is a crucial determinant of protection in the model, we estimate a Probit 
equation on political organization using a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood 
estimator and find evidence of loss aversion in lobby formation: an industry is more 
likely to become organized if it has a loss. 
 The next section in this chapter discusses the literature related to protection of 
declining industries and the anti-trade bias in trade policy, and describes the concept 
of loss aversion, its implications and the evidence that supports it. In Chapter 2 we 
study the implications of loss aversion for trade policy. First, we present the model 
and solve for the equilibrium trade policies. We then show that if individual 
preferences exhibit loss aversion, higher protection will be given to sectors in which 
profits are declining. We also show that if the coefficient of loss aversion is 
sufficiently large, then trade policy will have an anti-trade bias. Finally, we 
endogenize lobby formation and study the implications that this has for trade policy, 
protection and the anti-trade bias. In Chapter 3 we estimate the parameters of the 
model and provide empirical evidence of the relevance of loss aversion for trade 
policy determination and lobby formation. In Chapter 4 we conclude. 
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1.2 Literature 
 
1.2.1 Declining Industries and Protection: The Loser’s Paradox 
 
 Several authors have reported that a disproportionate share of protection is 
given to declining industries. Typical examples in the US and many other developed 
countries include textiles, agriculture, footwear and steel. In the US, Hufbauer, 
Berliner and Elliot (1986) and Hufbauer and Rosen (1986) study 31 cases of special 
protection for troubled industries. Ray (1991) presents econometric evidence that 
protection is associated with slow-growth and declining industries. Marvel and Ray 
(1983) provide evidence that the pattern of protection that resulted from the Kennedy 
Round was structured to minimize the cost of disruption for domestic industries 
facing significant import threats. They find that an industry’s growth rate is 
negatively related to its level of protection, and also that NTBs were used 
systematically to offset losses for domestic firms that would have occurred as a result 
of tariff reductions.  
 Moreover, national laws and principles in international trade agreements allow 
for the use of some forms of protection favoring domestic over foreign firms, such as 
antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguards, provided that injury conditions or 
threats of injury to an established industry due to imports exist. Baldwin and Steagall 
(1994) and Baldwin (1985) find a significant positive correlation between affirmative 
“serious injury” findings by the US International Trade Commission (ITC) and 
declining profits and employment. Interestingly, the former also find that the ITC 
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tends to make an affirmative decision “regardless of the source of the injury” (i.e., 
whether it is caused by imports or other factors).  
 Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) refer to the fact that “losers” win a 
disproportionate share of government’s support as the losers’ paradox.9 According to 
the pressure-group approach, interest groups that spend more on lobbying should, 
other things equal, receive the most government support. Given that we would expect 
bigger and expanding industries to be in a better position to finance lobbying 
expenditures, the fact that a surprising amount of support goes to declining sectors is 
puzzling. One explanation for this is the conservative social welfare function due to 
Corden (1974), by which politicians place a larger weight on reductions than on 
increases in income. But, since a specific form of the policymaker’s objective 
function is imposed and not derived from microfoundations, the answer is basically 
assumed.10 In addition, due to its political economy component, our model can 
account for the fact that not all declining industries get similar protection: organized 
industries often receive more protection than unorganized ones.11  
 Hillman (1982) and Cassing and Hillman (1986) use a political support 
function to study why declining industries that receive protection continue to decline. 
                                                 
9 They provide a review of the literature that addresses this paradox. 
 
10 In contrast, we will focus on the effects of loss aversion on the behavior of individuals (which in turn 
translates to firms and lobbying groups), and use a model in which the policymaker’s objective 
function can be derived from microfoundations. 
 
11 The political economy literature on trade protection has emphasized the importance of political 
influences in determining trade policy. See GH (1994), Goldberg and Maggi (1999), and Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000), for instance. 
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However, these approaches do not explain why declining industries receive protection 
in the first place.12  
 Grossman and Helpman (1996) rely on free riding by new entrants in growing 
industries to show that early entrants in those industries will have little incentive to 
lobby, whereas declining industries are not likely to face new entry, since they 
presumably offer below normal rates of return on new investment. In a related paper, 
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) use a lobbying model that allows for free entry 
and sunk costs to show that in expanding industries, entry tends to erode the rents 
obtained from lobbying, while in declining industries, sunk costs rule out entry 
provided that the rents are not too high. The asymmetry in appropriability leads to 
asymmetric lobbying and so to losers getting most of the protection.13  
 Independent work by Freund and Ozden (2004), written after our first version 
of the theoretical part of this thesis, studies the effects of loss aversion on trade 
protection, with a focus on the effects of negative shocks on protection. They also 
study the dynamics of protectionist policies and show that protection following a 
negative price shock will be persistent, which we do not explicitly address here.14 
                                                 
12 Van Long and Vousden (1991) show that Hillman’s main result holds also in a general equilibrium 
framework. Brainard and Verdier (1997) suggest that liquidity constraints on lobbying activities may 
be more binding in growing industries than in declining ones. 
 
13 However, one would expect that in declining industries the probability of exiting the industry is 
higher, which would reduce the expected benefit from lobbying. In addition, our model differs from 
these approaches in that it can explain not only why organized declining industries get more 
protection, but also why governments may have an incentive to provide higher protection to losers than 
winners even if the industries are unorganized, that is, even if the government is a pure social welfare 
maximizer. 
 
14 Our first version was written in July 2003. We presented a version of the theoretical and empirical 
results at the Inter-University Graduate Student Conference at Yale University in May 2004, and at the 
North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society in June 2004. 
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Their modeling of loss aversion is different from ours in that they do not incorporate 
the effects of positive changes on utility, which leads to different predictions than the 
ones we obtain. Other differences are, first, that they do not formally address the anti-
trade bias puzzle. 15 Second, they take lobby formation as exogenous and thus do not 
study the effects of loss aversion on lobby formation. Finally, they do not test the 
predictions of their model. 
 
1.2.2 The Anti-Trade Bias 
 In this section we will cite some of the explanations that have been provided 
by the literature concerning the anti-trade bias in trade policy. As Rodrik (1995) 
mentions, one possible answer is that tariffs were initially imposed for revenue 
reasons and that the anti-trade bias persists due to some bias toward the status quo. In 
that line, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) explain persistence by showing that there is a 
bias toward the status quo, and therefore against efficiency enhancing reforms such as 
trade liberalization, if some of the winners and losers from the reform cannot be 
identified ex ante. As a result, liberalization may be rejected under majority voting 
even though it would have received adequate political support ex post had it been 
adopted. Another explanation that relates the anti-trade bias to a status quo bias is due 
to the conservative welfare function postulated by Corden (1974), described earlier. 
                                                 
15 They obtain the prediction that a deviation from free trade will result under loss aversion even if the 
government maximizes social welfare only, but do not explicitly address the question of why 
protection is typically biased in favor of import-competing sectors rather than export sectors, and thus 
there is an anti-trade bias. (They state that their model does not directly address the anti-trade bias and 
only mention some potential reasons of why it might arise). 
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However, these arguments do not explain the initial structure of protection, but rather 
take it as given. In addition, except for the case of less developed countries, we can 
question the importance of the revenue motive for the use of trade policy in most of 
the other countries at present, as well as for the use of quantity restrictions that do not 
produce revenue. 
 Olson (1983) states that negative shocks will lead to more lobby formation 
due to the fact that they reduce the benefit for potential entrants, and therefore reduce 
the free-rider problem associated with lobby formation. If negative shocks affect 
primarily import-competing sectors, this could lead to an anti-trade bias. 
Nevertheless, those shocks would also increase the probability of exiting the industry, 
reducing the expected benefit of lobby formation.16 
 Combining analytical and numerical techniques, Eaton and Grossman (1985) 
show that trade policy will often have an anti-trade bias in a small economy that faces 
uncertain terms of trade if some factors are immobile ex post and insurance markets 
are incomplete. They assume that when capital is allocated between production 
activities the terms of trade are unknown. A tariff redistributes income toward the 
group with a higher marginal utility in either of the two states of nature considered, 
acting as a partial substitute for insurance. However, Dixit has shown in various 
papers that not explicitly modeling the causes for markets to be incomplete can lead 
to erroneous policy proposals.17  
                                                 
16 Moreover, it is not clear why negative shocks would affect mostly import-competing sectors. 
 
17 See, for instance, Dixit (1989). We should point out that, in contrast to theirs, our argument does not 
rely on uncertainty or incomplete markets. 
  13 
 
 Finally, Limão and Panagariya (2004) use a general equilibrium model to 
show that an anti-trade bias can arise provided that the elasticity of substitution in 
production is larger than one. Also in a general equilibrium framework, Limão and 
Panagariya (2003) show that if the government’s objective reflects a concern for 
inequality, or diminishing political support from factor owners, then trade policy 
exhibits an anti-trade bias. The reason is that, starting from a symmetric equilibrium, 
the same shock that leads the economy to trade leaves the owners of the import factor 
worse off relative to the owners of the export factor, and a tariff reverses some of this 
equity loss. Our approach differs in that we explicitly model the political process and 
that we rely on loss aversion in individual preferences instead of an inequality 
concern on the part of the government to explain the anti-trade bias. 
 
1.2.3 Loss Aversion  
 In traditional expected utility theory, the domain of the utility function is final 
assets, rather than gains or losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide evidence 
that value or utility is determined by changes in wealth, and thus they emphasize the 
importance of changes as opposed to final asset positions that include current 
wealth.18 
                                                 
18 Markowitz (1952) was the first to propose that utility be defined on gains and losses rather than on 
final asset positions. Nonetheless, as the authors point out, the emphasis on changes does not imply 
that the value of a particular change is independent of the initial position. Value should be treated as a 
function in two arguments: the asset position and the magnitude of the change from the reference point 
(although the representation as a function of one argument can be a satisfactory approximation when 
changes are small or even moderate). 
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 Another important characteristic of preferences of which Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) find evidence is that the disutility that one experiences in losing a 
sum of money is greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount. 
This phenomenon is called loss aversion and it leads to a utility function that is 
steeper for losses than for gains. The concept was first defined in the framework of 
prospect theory and then extended to choice under certainty (Tversky and Kahneman 
[1991]). Several experiments have suggested a coefficient of loss aversion of about 2 
under both risky and riskless choices.19  
 An implication of loss aversion is what has been called the status quo bias: 
individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because the 
disadvantages of leaving it receive more weight than the advantages.20 
 Finally, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find evidence of what they call 
diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with 
their size. Note that this does not hold under a concave utility, which implies 
increasing sensitivity to losses. 
 Based on the findings described above, Kahneman and Tversky (1992) 
propose a value function defined over gains and losses relative to some reference 
point -such as the status quo- with a slope that changes abruptly at the reference point, 
consistent with loss aversion. Specifically, they propose a function of the following 
form: 
                                                 
19 See Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), Tversky and Kahneman (1990) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991). 
 
20 See Knetsch (1989), who conducts an experiment that illustrates the status-quo bias. See also 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), who demonstrated this effect using different experiments. 
  15 
 
 
 
 <−−
≥=
0)(
0
)(
xifx
xifx
xv β
α
λ  
 
whereλ is the coefficient of loss aversion and x is measured as the difference in 
wealth with respect to the last time wealth was measured. Using experimental 
evidence, they estimateα andβ  to be 0.88 (consistent with diminishing sensitivity) 
andλ to be 2.25.21 
 We should point out that, besides reference dependence and diminishing 
sensitivity over both gains and losses,  loss aversion also differs from a standard 
concave utility function in that the slope of the value function changes abruptly at the 
reference level, so that we have a pronounced asymmetry even for arbitrarily small 
gains and losses. As Tversky and Kahneman (1992) say “The observed asymmetry 
between gains and losses is far too extreme to be explained by income effects or by 
decreasing risk aversion.” (p. 298). In fact, an important aspect of loss aversion is that 
it can resolve the criticism on expected utility put forward by Rabin (2000) and Rabin 
and Thaler (2001), who show that for any concave utility function, even very little 
risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over larger 
stakes.22 
                                                 
 
21 The estimation was based on an experiment involving 25 graduate students from Berkeley and 
Stanford, in which subjects indicated preferences between different sure outcomes and a risky 
prospect. Certainty equivalents were thus derived from observed choices, and the authors used a 
nonlinear regression procedure to estimate the parameters separately for each subject and then obtained 
their median values. 
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 Several existing studies have used loss aversion to explain different puzzles. 
These include Dunn (1996), who using survey evidence from seven labor markets, 
presents empirically determined indifference functions for income and leisure which 
exhibit loss aversion, and this in turn can explain the theoretically unexpected 
stability observed in labor markets when there is an overtime premium. Some 
theoretical papers that incorporate loss aversion into worker’s preferences include 
Bhaskar (1990) and Mc Donald and Sibly (2001). Shea (1995) finds that consumption 
responds more strongly to predictable income declines than to predictable income 
increases. That asymmetry is consistent with models in which preferences exhibit loss 
aversion (see Bowman, Minehart and Rabin [1999]). Benartzi and Thaler (1995) use 
loss aversion to explain the equity premium puzzle. In recent years, loss aversion has 
also been frequently applied in behavioral finance. For example, Barberis et al. 
(2001) introduce loss aversion into investor preferences and show that their model 
reproduces some puzzling features of aggregate asset pricing data, such as the high 
mean, volatility and predictability of stock returns. Similarly, Barberis and Huang 
(2001) use loss aversion to explain the time series and cross-sectional behavior of 
individual stocks. The marketing literature has also reported evidence of loss aversion 
in consumer judgment and choice. For instance, Puttler (1992) and Hardie, Johnson 
and Fader (1993) find evidence of loss aversion in the demand for eggs and orange 
juice, respectively. Another example is Van Ittersum et al. (2004), who show that the 
importance of product attributes in consumer judgment and choice is larger if the 
attribute levels represent a loss relative to the consumer’s reference point. 
                                                                                                                                           
22 For example, Rabin (2000) shows that a person who turns down a 50-50 bet of losing $100 and 
gaining $110 would also turn down a 50-50 bet of losing $1000 and gaining any amount of money. 
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Chapter 2: Implications of Loss Aversion for Trade Policy 
 
2.1 The Model 
 
 We consider a small competitive economy that takes world prices as given (in 
section 2.3.2 we consider the case of large economies). Individuals have identical 
preferences but may differ in their factor endowments. They maximize their utility, 
which is given by 
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where 0x is consumption of the numeraire good; ix denotes consumption of good i,     
i = 1, 2, ... , n; E~ is income derived from the sale of factor endowments; )~(EΦ  
denotes the expected value of E~ , which is determined in the previous period; 
and 1>λ is the coefficient of loss aversion.23 The sub-utility functions )(⋅iu are 
differentiable, increasing and strictly concave.  
                                                 
23 We should point out that the coefficient of loss aversion was introduced in prospect theory and thus 
the parameter λ in our model does not strictly correspond to the coefficient of loss aversion defined 
under uncertainty. However, Tversky and Kahneman (1991), who extend loss aversion to the case of 
choice under certainty, mention thatλ (which captures the asymmetry of the welfare effects between 
consumption below and above the reference point in their modeling) can be interpreted as the 
coefficient of loss aversion. 
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 Individuals in our model derive utility (or value) not only from consumption 
levels but also from deviations in their income from their expected income. An 
employee who already expected to earn a certain salary might consider receiving a 
lower salary than the one he expected as a loss, even if the salary he actually receives 
is higher than it was in the previous period. We appeal to the psychological motives 
that lie behind the evidence on the “endowment effect”, in which individuals become 
attached to a good once they own it and thus giving it up represents a loss for them; 
and this loss has a larger welfare effect than the gain associated with receiving it.24 
Köszegi and Rabin (2005), who define the reference point as recent expectations 
about outcomes, argue that such evidence can also be interpreted in terms of 
expectations, since in those cases people would expect to keep the status quo. In the 
typical experiment all individuals are “given” a mug to inspect, but only the owners 
are told it belongs to them and can keep it.25 Therefore, it can be argued that the 
difference between owners and non-owners “(...) is not current or lagged physical 
possession, but rather expectation of future possession.” (p.16).26 Presumably the 
same is true regarding income: once an individual has incorporated a certain 
                                                 
24 See Thaler (1980), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991). The 
reference point is typically assumed to be the pre-choice status quo, or past consumption, although 
Kahneman and Tversky do not provide a theory of determination of the reference point. 
 
25 In the experiments, some subjects are given a mug and are told they own it, while others are only 
asked to inspect the mug from their neighbors. 
 
26 Köszegi and Rabin (2005) cite some evidence that indicates that expectations are more important in 
determining people’s perceptions of gains and losses than the status quo or past consumption. For 
instance, Loewenstein (1988) finds that the amount that people have to be paid to delay receiving a 
good they have anticipated getting today is larger than what they are willing to pay to speed up 
receiving a good they had expected to get in the future. This also indicates that unanticipated losses 
loom larger than unanticipated gains. In addition, they mention some studies that report evidence on 
emotions and neural responses to both the outcome of a lottery and its unattained outcome. 
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expectation concerning his level of income, a lower realization of income would be 
regarded as a loss. As Köszegi and Rabin (2005) state: “An employee who had been 
confidently expecting a 10% raise might assess a raise of only 5% as a loss.” (p.2)27  
 Thus, the first term in (1), given by ∑+ )(0 ii xux , reflects utility over 
consumption.  The second term captures the idea that individuals care about changes 
in their income with respect to the level of income they had expected to have, with 
losses looming larger than gains.28  
 We will introduce and focus on the effects of unanticipated shocks only, and 
therefore the expectation of income formed in the previous period equals income in 
the previous period, that is, )1(~)~( −=Φ EE . 
                                                 
27 Köszegi and Rabin (2005) point out that modeling the reference point as expectations makes 
possible to avoid some dismissals of the theory of Kahneman and Tversky that occur when applied as 
traditionally interpreted, such as in Plott and Zeiler (2003) and List (2003). Thus, they state that 
findings by List (2003) that the endowment effect can be overcome by traders with significant market 
experience, for instance, could be interpreted as more experienced traders expecting a high probability 
of parting with items they have just acquired.  
 
28 It is common to add to the utility function a loss aversion term that captures the effects of changes in 
consumption or income with respect to the reference point. For instance, Bowman et al. (1999) define 
utility as a sum of a function that captures utility over a reference level of consumption, and a gain-loss 
utility function that depends on the changes in consumption with respect to the reference point (this 
gain-loss function satisfies loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity). Köszegi and Rabin (2005) define 
utility also as the sum of a consumption utility function (that depends on the level of consumption) and 
a gain-loss utility function. (We should point out that although they describe utility as defined over 
consumption, in their analysis they consider two dimensions of choice: consumption goods and dollar 
wealth, and thus unexpected changes in wealth also affect utility and exhibit loss aversion. The same is 
true in Heidhues and Köszegi (2005), who draw on the framework of Köszegi and Rabin (2005) and 
also incorporate loss aversion in money). Barberis et al. (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2001) model 
utility as the sum of a term capturing utility over consumption and another term capturing the effect of 
changes in wealth. They point out that even if the second term were not present, individuals would still 
care about changes in income because of what those changes mean for consumption, and by adding the 
second term they take the view that changes in income generate utility over and above the indirect 
utility that comes through consumption. (They suggest that an investor’s income may be associated 
with ego, self-esteem, or a feeling of mastery). Our modeling relies on the evidence of loss aversion 
under certainty and incorporates Köszegi and Rabin (2005)’s argument that deviations from what 
people expected to have affect utility directly, as we mentioned above. 
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 An individual with income E  will consume 1)]('[)( −== iiiii pupdx of good 
i, and ∑−= i iii pdpEx )(0 of the numeraire good. The indirect utility function is: 
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where p is the vector of domestic prices, and the consumer surplus derived from the 
non-numeraire goods is given by ( ) ∑∑ −= i iiii iii pdppdus )()()(p . 
 Good 0 is manufactured from labor alone with constant returns to scale and an 
input-output coefficient equal to 1. It is assumed that the supply of labor is large 
enough to ensure that some of this good is always produced. Then, the wage rate 
equals 1 in equilibrium. Each of the non-numeraire goods is produced using labor and 
a sector-specific factor, with constant returns to scale. The supply of the specific 
factors is fixed. Since the wage is fixed, the rents derived from the specific factors are 
a function of the domestic price only. We denote these rewards by )( ii pΠ . By 
Hotelling’s lemma, output is given by )( iii py Π′= . 
 The government can implement trade taxes and subsidies. The net per capita 
revenue from all taxes and subsidies is: 
 
 ∑  −−= ∗i iiiiii pyNpdppr )(1)()()(p      (3) 
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where ∗ip is the world price of good i and N measures the total population. We 
assume that the government redistributes revenue uniformly to all individuals and 
thus r(p) equals the net transfer to each individual.  
 An individual derives income from wages and government transfers, and 
potentially from the ownership of some specific factor. We assume that they own at 
most one specific factor. The owners of the specific factor used in industry i may 
decide to organize themselves into lobby groups. For now we will assume that in 
some exogenous set of sectors L, the specific factors have been able to organize for 
political activity (later on we endogenize lobby formation). Each lobby offers the 
government a contribution schedule, )(piC , which maps every policy that the 
government might choose into a campaign contribution level. We denote the joint 
welfare of the members of lobby i by iii CWV −= , where iW is their gross-of-
contributions joint welfare, given by: 29 
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where il is the labor supply (also labor income) of the owners of the specific input 
used in industry i, and iθ is the fraction of the population that owns some of this 
                                                 
29 We will assume that there is a single owner of each specific factor. If we had more than owner and 
each one owns a fraction jδ of the specific factor i (where j could vary across owners), then it can be 
shown that the only difference is that the loss and gain terms (the third term in equation (4) and the 
protection equation that we derive, shown in (8)) would be multiplied by the number of individuals 
who own the specific factor i. None of our results (propositions 1 to 5) would be affected by this. 
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factor. We will assume, for simplicity, that ownership in any given sector is highly 
concentrated, so that 0→iθ  and each industry lobbies only for its own product. This 
allows us to abstract from the effects of lobby competition and focus on the 
interaction between the government and each of the lobbies. This assumption and the 
fact that what we include in the loss aversion term is the income derived from the sale 
of factor endowments allow us to abstract from some effects that are not crucial in 
terms of the results, while gaining significantly in tractability. In addition, we believe 
that the psychological motives behind loss aversion over changes in income with 
respect to expected income might be particularly strong for work income (return to 
labor and the specific factors), than for transfers exogenously received from the 
government.30 Therefore, we have that, for lobby i, 
[ ] iiiiiiiii EplNrplE
ii
~)()()(limlim
00
≡Π+=+Π+≡ →→ pθθθ  and: 31 
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30 An implication of this is that if the government uses a lump sum transfer to fully compensate a sector 
for which income from factor endowments is lower than it was expected, that would not eliminate the 
motive for using a tariff. We should also point out that including the tariff revenue in the loss aversion 
term would only reinforce the anti-trade bias result that we discuss later on, since an import tariff leads 
to a transfer of income to the individuals while an export subsidy implies that the government must 
levy resources from them and therefore tends to generate losses. Also, excluding this from the loss 
aversion term allows us to identify the industries with losses and gains in the empirical implementation 
of the model.  
 
31 We take the factor endowments of each individual as constant across periods. Therefore, 
)()( )1(−Π<Π iiii pp if and only if )1(−< ii EE  and )()( )1(−Π≥Π iiii pp  if and only 
if )1(−≥ ii EE . 
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where )( )1(−Π ii p denotes last period’s profits for the lobby. 
 The government maximizes a weighted sum of contributions and social 
welfare: 
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where social welfare is obtained by adding indirect utilities over all individuals: 
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 The game is a two-stage noncooperative game in which the lobbies 
simultaneously choose their political contribution schedules in the first stage and the 
government sets the policy and collects the contributions associated with it in the 
second, as in GH (1994). They define the equilibrium drawing on the work of 
Bernheim and Whinston (1986).32  
                                                 
32 In particular, they state that { }( )00 , pLiiC ∈ is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if: 
a) 0iC is feasible for all Li∈ ; b) 0p maximizes ∑
∈
+
Li
i aWC )()(
0 pp on P; c) 0p maximizes 
∑
∈
++−
Li
ijj aWCCW )()()()(
00 pppp on P for every Lj ∈ ; and d) for every Lj ∈ there exists a 
Pj ∈p that maximizes ∑
∈
+
Li
i aWC )()(
0 pp on P such that 0)(0 =jjC p . 
  24 
 
 In the Appendix we derive the equilibrium policies for both organized and 
unorganized sectors, and obtain a general equation for the equilibrium policies: 
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where ∗∗−= iiii pppt /)~(~ is the equilibrium ad valorem trade tax or subsidy; 1=iI if 
Li∈ and zero otherwise; ( ) ( ))1(~~ −Π−Π=∆Π iiiii pp ; )~(/)~(~ iiiii pmpyz = is the 
equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports (negative for exports); and 
)~(/~)~(~ iiiiii pmppme ′−= is the elasticity of import demand (defined to be positive) or 
export supply (defined to be negative). For any variable x, we use x~ to denote its 
equilibrium value. 
 Notice that there is protection even for the unorganized sectors, which is due 
to the direct effect on utility generated by changes in income with respect to its 
reference level.33 Therefore, the model predicts protection even if the government is a 
pure social welfare maximizer, that is, if ∞→a . In addition, we can distinguish the 
effect that loss aversion has on protection from a status-quo bias effect. For a sector 
that experiences a loss, loss aversion works in the direction of increasing protection in 
order to attenuate the negative effect the loss has on utility, and hence in that case we 
                                                 
33 Thus, we should also point out that if exporters gain when the country opens to trade, the fact that a 
gain increases utility leads to protection for the exporters even if they are unorganized. 
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could say that it moves the agents back toward their status-quo utility level. However, 
if we consider a sector that has a gain, loss aversion also leads to an increase in 
protection, because gains have a positive effect on utility and, therefore, in that case it 
tends to move the agents further away from the status quo.34 Finally, note that under 
diminishing sensitivity to income changes for both gains and losses (that is,α and β  
lower than one), larger changes are associated with lower protection (see equation 
(8)). As we mentioned before, this contrasts with the case of a concave utility. 
 
2.2 Protection to Declining Industries 
 In this section we discuss how loss aversion leads to a bias by which 
protection tends to favor industries in which profitability is declining. First, recalling 
that the GH model yields the following solution for the equilibrium policies: 
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we can see that in that model past profits, and more precisely whether the sector is 
better off or worse off with respect to the previous period, play no role in determining 
the levels of protection. Our model implies that, given symmetry between two sectors 
in everything (including size) except in that one experiences a loss and the other a 
                                                 
 
34 Nonetheless, for two sectors that are symmetric in all respects except that one has a loss and the 
other a gain of equal magnitude, loss aversion leads to higher protection for the sector that experiences 
a loss. Below we say more about this. 
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gain of equal magnitude, the sector that experiences a loss receives higher protection 
(a higher import tariff or export subsidy). This result is stated in proposition 1 (see the 
Appendix for the proof). The reason is that under loss aversion losses loom larger 
than gains. In particular, according to the estimates of Kahneman and Tversky (1992) 
for βα , andλ , the second term inside the brackets in (8) is approximately twice as 
large for the sector that is worse off than for the sector that is better off.35  
 
Proposition 1. (Protection to declining industries): Consider two sectors, i and j, 
which are symmetric in all respects except that one has a loss and the other a gain of 
similar magnitude, that is:  i) 0<∆Π i ;  ii) 0>∆Π j ; and  iii) i∆Π = j∆Π .36 Under 
loss aversion, the “loser” sector gets higher protection. 
 
Hence, while the GH model does not explain why protection is usually given to 
sectors in which profits are declining, our model implies that, under loss aversion, 
higher protection will be given to those sectors in which profitability is declining, 
other things equal. This will also have implications for the prediction of an anti-trade 
bias, as we discuss in the next section. Note that this result would not hold under a 
                                                 
35 Recall that they estimateλ to be about 2. 
 
36 For example, assume a pre-trade situation in which ji yy >  (demands equal respective outputs and 
everything else is symmetric between both sectors), and their prices are equal to the world prices, 
which in turn equal one by the choice of units. Introduce a shock to the endowments of the specific 
factors that reduces output in sector i by 2/)( ji yy −  and increases output in sector j by the same 
amount. Therefore, after the shock, ji yy ′=′ , and the sectors are symmetric in all respects except that 
one has a loss and the other a gain of equal magnitude. (The country now imports good i and exports 
good j, which results in an import tariff being imposed on good i and an export subsidy on good j).  
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standard concave utility function (or a government with an inequality concern), since 
in that case symmetry in size would lead to similar protection for both sectors, 
regardless of the fact that one sector has a loss and the other a gain. Another example 
of how loss aversion leads to different predictions for protection is that if we consider 
a situation in which all sectors experience equal losses, the inequality concern motive 
does not lead to any transfers for them, while the loss aversion motive predicts 
protection for all. 
 In addition, in contrast to Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) and GH (1996), 
our model not only provides an explanation as to why organized declining industries 
get more protection, but also as to why governments may have an incentive to 
respond more vigorously to protect losers than promote winners even if the industries 
are unorganized, that is, even if the government is a pure social welfare maximizer. 
On the other hand, in contrast to the results that would arise with a utilitarian 
government or the conservative social welfare function due to Corden (1974), our 
model can account for the fact that organized industries typically receive more 
protection than unorganized ones, due to its political economy component. 
 
2.3 The Anti-trade Bias Puzzle 
2.3.1 A small economy 
 We begin by considering the case of a small economy. First, we explain how 
the GH model predicts a pro-trade bias. Consider the GH model with two non-
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numeraire goods, good 1 and good 2. Start with complete symmetry between sectors 
in consumption and production, and assume that under autarky their domestic prices 
are equal to their respective world prices, which in turn equal unity by the choice of 
units. Thus, initially there is no trade. Suppose that the endowments of the specific 
factors change such that the output of good 1 increases by 1 percent and that of good 
2 contracts by 1 percent. Good 1 then becomes an export good and good 2 and import 
good, with trade balancing between them under no intervention. Now recall that the 
GH model predicts the equilibrium policies given by (9) and therefore an export 
subsidy on good 1 and a tariff on good 2 (provided that both sectors are organized). 
Moreover, given the symmetry assumption, the import tariff is lower than the export 
subsidy due to the fact that the export sector is larger and the level of protection is 
proportional to output. This implies that exports increase by more than imports 
decrease and therefore there is a pro-trade bias, since the volume of trade is larger 
than under free trade. This was the result pointed out by Levy (1999). We should 
point out that the anti or pro-trade bias refers to the outcome of trade policy (the 
volume of trade relative to the free-trade equilibrium) and not to the direction of 
change of trade policy after any given shock.37 Given its neutrality assumptions, this 
is the most natural starting point to study the anti-trade bias puzzle. Previous authors, 
such as Limão and Panagariya (2004, 2003) also consider a symmetric scenario as the 
starting point. This allows us to neutralize the effects one could obtain by introducing 
any arbitrary asymmetries that may provide other motives for an anti-trade bias. In 
                                                 
37 We should also mention that it is possible to obtain an anti-trade bias in the Grossman and Helpman 
model if we introduce some arbitrary asymmetries in the elasticities, for instance, or if there is only 
one non-numeraire good and it is imported. However, in the last case the result arises only because the 
export sector (which produces the numeraire good) is not allowed to lobby. 
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addition, it allows us to show how an anti-trade bias can arise under loss aversion in 
the same context in which the GH model has been shown to predict a pro-trade bias. 
Later we look at cases in which the initial situation is not symmetric. 
 Let us now turn to our model. Consider again two non-numeraire goods and 
similar symmetry assumptions. Introduce the same shock that increases output of 
good 1 by 1 percent and contracts output of good 2 by 1 percent. Given that the loss 
(in the absence of intervention) for the import sector is of equal magnitude than the 
gain for the export sector, without further assumptions the model can predict a pro or 
anti-trade bias.  The reason is that while on the one hand the lower output in the 
import sector calls for a lower level of protection (the “size effect”), the loss 
experienced by that sector looms larger than the similar gain of the export sector, due 
to loss aversion, and the direction of the bias will depend on which of these two 
effects dominates. The following proposition provides the condition under which the 
model predicts an anti-trade bias (see the Appendix for the proof). 
 
Proposition 2. (Anti-trade bias condition): Consider a small country with two sectors 
that are initially symmetric in consumption and production, and the autarkic prices 
equal the world prices, which in turn equal one by the choice of units. This implies 
that initially there is no trade (in the absence of intervention). Introduce a shock that 
increases output in sector 1 and reduces output in sector 2 by the same amount. There 
will be an anti-trade bias if and only if the following condition holds:  
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If we set βα = 38 and let 21 ∆Π=∆Π≡∆Π  in (10), we obtain: 
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That is, for a sufficiently large coefficient of loss aversion, the model generates an 
anti-trade bias. We should stress that 1>λ is a necessary condition for (11) to hold, 
so that we need loss aversion to be present and the coefficient of loss aversion to be 
large enough.39 In the previous section, we explained that the predictions for 
protection under loss aversion differ from those obtained under a concave utility or a 
government with an inequality concern. We can add here that under the scenario 
considered in proposition 2, an inequality concern would lead to a tariff for sector 2 
and an export tax for sector 1. The export tax arises because in that case positive 
                                                 
38 Kahneman and Tversky (1992) estimate α and β to be 0.88. We also find empirical support for the 
assumption that βα =  in Chapter 3. 
 
39 If we do not set βα = one could have the condition holding for β sufficiently larger than α even if 
1=λ . However, having β greater than α would be an alternative way of modeling loss aversion, since 
it implies a larger effect on utility of losses versus gains. We prefer to model loss aversion by means of 
the coefficient λ , and letα and β capture diminishing sensitivity, as do Kahneman and Tversky 
(1992). The main point is that, in any case, we need a discontinuity in the slope to obtain an anti-trade 
bias. 
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changes do not generate utility; instead, they lead to an increase inequality. Moreover, 
a concave utility would not generate an anti-trade bias under the same conditions that 
loss aversion does. For instance, if we consider the scenario mentioned in proposition 
1, where both sectors have the same size after the shock but the import sector loses 
due to the shock while the export sector gains, loss aversion would lead to an anti-
trade bias whereas a concave utility would not; it would predict equal protection for 
both sectors. 
 Note that (11) is more likely to hold if: a) the output of good 1 is not too large 
compared to the output of good 2 (because if it were the export sector would have 
more to gain from protection); and b) the weight that the government places on social 
welfare, a, is not too small (so that the asymmetry between the importers’ loss and the 
exporters’ gain receives more weight in the government’s objective). Figure 1 shows 
the values ofλ  (lambda) and a for which the model predicts an anti-trade bias. 
 
 
Figure 1: Anti-Trade Bias 
 
  
  32 
 
 More generally, without imposing any symmetry assumptions, any shock that 
increases the endowment of the specific factor used in the export sector and decreases 
that of the factor used in the import sector  will generate an anti-trade bias if and only 
if: 
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Any technological shock that increases productivity in sector 1 and reduces 
productivity in sector 2 will have the same implications. Finally, consider again a 
situation in which the domestic prices of goods 1 and 2 under autarky are equal to 
their respective world prices. A shock that increases the world price of good 1 and 
decreases the world price of good 2 will cause good 1 to be exported and good 2 to be 
imported, generating an anti-trade bias if and only if (11’) holds.  
 The results of this section can be generalized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. Any shock that induces the country to trade both of the non-numeraire 
goods causing a loss for the import sector (in the absence of protection) leads to 
12 tt >  (i.e., trade policy has an anti-trade bias) if and only if the coefficient of loss 
aversion is sufficiently large, such that equation (11’) holds. 
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Before relaxing the small-country assumption, we discuss further the asymmetric 
initial configurations (i.e., without imposing any symmetry assumptions). Consider 
first a pre-trade situation in which output in sector 1 is larger than output in sector 2 
(both prices equal one by the choice of units) and there is a shock that leads the 
country to export good 1 and import good 2 causing a loss for the import sector. 40 As 
a result, after the shock we still have 21 yy > . Then, the size effect calls for a lower 
level of protection in sector 2 than in sector 1, but the loss aversion effect goes in the 
opposite direction, calling for higher protection in the import sector. Hence, if the 
coefficient of loss aversion is high enough for condition (11’) to hold, there will be an 
anti-trade bias.  
 Now suppose that, initially, output is larger in sector 2 and introduce the same 
type of shock. If the ordering of outputs is reversed so that 12 yy <  after the shock, we 
have a situation similar to the one previously discussed in terms of the direction of the 
effects, i.e. the size effect and the loss aversion effect work in opposite directions, and 
there will be an anti-trade bias if and only if equation (11’) holds. On the other hand, 
if the output ranking is preserved, so that 12 yy >  after the shock, then both the size 
effect and the loss aversion effect work in the same direction, making the anti-trade 
bias condition more likely to hold. In particular, if 
( ) ( ) 1)1(112)1(22 // ∆Π∆Π=∆Π∆Π −− ββ EE , and 1122 mpmp ′=′  after the shock, the 
                                                 
40 From our previous discussion of the various shocks that have these effects one can see that nearly all 
the possible shocks that lead the country to trade both of the non-numeraire goods will cause a loss for 
the import-competing sector. 
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right hand side of (11’) will be less than 1. 41 In that case (11’) will always hold (since 
it is sufficient that 1≥λ ) and we get an anti-trade bias for sure.42 
 
2.3.2 Two large countries 
 We now turn to the case of large economies. Consider a world with two 
countries, home and foreign, that are identical in all respects. Initially there is no 
motive for trade or for a tariff or subsidy. Next, consider a shock that causes the 
following: ∗∗ =>= 1221 yyyy ,43 where stars denote foreign country variables. Since 
the optimum tariff argument can easily generate an anti-trade bias by providing an 
incentive for trade protection in order to improve the terms of trade, we look at the 
cooperative case to ensure that our results are not driven by the terms of trade motive. 
Let wiii pp τ= , where 1<iτ denotes an import subsidy or export tax and 1>iτ  
denotes an import tariff or export subsidy, and wip denotes the world price of good i. 
                                                 
 
41 We use βα = . 
 
42 We can also consider a situation in which the country is initially trading with the rest of the world 
and introduce a shock that goes in the opposite direction, that is, one that reduces output in sector 1 and 
increases output in sector 2. Now it is the export sector the one that loses, and loss aversion calls for 
higher protection in that sector (the size effect doing the opposite). Although in this case it is possible 
to obtain a pro-trade bias, it is also possible to still have an anti-trade bias if protection ends up being 
higher in sector 2 than in sector 1, either because the size effect dominates or if we started out with a 
situation in which 12 tt >  (recall that this is what the model predicts that would arise when the country 
opens to trade, provided that the loss aversion coefficient is large enough). In addition, if the shock is 
sufficiently large we could have that the country reverts to autarky, in which case it is not clear that the 
government would want to protect sector 1 with an export subsidy instead of an import tariff, or even 
that the export sector turns into an import-competing sector and so the optimal policy becomes an 
import tariff. Consequently, we can have negative shocks to the export sector and still get an anti-trade 
bias. 
 
43 For example, consider a transfer of δ units of the specific factor of sector 2 from home to foreign and 
δ units of the factor specific to sector 1 from foreign to home. 
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We focus on the net effect of the policies in each sector, ∗− 11 ττ  or ∗− 22 ττ . The 
cooperative equilibrium gives:44 
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Therefore, ∗− 22 ττ  is positive (that is, there is net trade protection) 45 if and only if: 
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which is exactly condition (10) replacing ∗2y for 1y . Hence, we have that if the 
coefficient of loss aversion is sufficiently large, there will be an anti-trade bias in 
trade policy in a model with two large economies. This differs from the GH model, in 
                                                 
 
44 Given symmetry, we only present the results for good 2. The cooperative equilibrium consists of sets 
of contribution functions and trade policy vectors for the home and foreign countries such that the 
settlement is efficient from the point of view of both governments, and that no lobby can gain by 
restructuring its contribution schedule. It is derived by maximizing the joint welfare of each lobby and 
a hypothetical mediator when the contribution schedules of all other lobbies are taken as given (See 
GH [1995] for more details). 
 
45 The domestic tariff on good 2 would exceed the export subsidy in the foreign country on good 2. We 
could also have an export tax that exceeds an import subsidy, since 2τ and ∗2τ are set so as to effect a 
transfer between the countries. But in any case, the net effect of intervention is to restrict trade. 
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which the cooperative equilibrium results in net trade promotion, as Levy (1999) has 
shown.46 
 
2.4 Endogenous Lobby Formation 
 So far we have considered the set of organized industries as exogenous. Some 
authors have shown that, when studying the policies that arise in the presence of 
organized interest groups, endogenizing lobby formation may lead to important and 
surprising changes in the results. For instance, Mitra (1999) provides a theory of 
lobby formation in the framework of the GH model and shows that the equilibrium 
trade subsidy for an organized group becomes not always positively related to the 
government’s affinity for political contributions.47 These findings highlight the 
importance of accounting for the effects of lobby formation on the equilibrium 
policies. In this section we allow for endogenous formation of lobbies and show that 
loss aversion has important implications for political organization, and this in turn 
                                                 
 
46 The intuition is analogous to the one for the case of a small economy, discussed in the previous 
section.  
 
47 He also shows that, if everyone in the population owns a specific factor, free trade may arise in 
equilibrium either when the government is highly responsive to political contributions or when it is 
highly welfare oriented. In addition, Drazen, Limão and Stratmann (2004) use a model of bargaining 
between interest groups and the government to show that caps on the contributions that lobbies can 
make will actually lead to an increase in the number of lobbies that form, as long as the cap is not too 
low. The larger number of lobbies, in turn, may imply an increase in the total amount of contributions 
made and a decrease in social welfare, and they find empirical support for their prediction using data 
for the US. This result contrasts with the literature on campaign finance reform that argues that 
contribution limits can reduce the amount of money in politics and increase social welfare, but assumes 
that the number of lobbies is fixed.  
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will have an effect on trade policy, protection to declining industries and the anti-
trade bias, in addition to some broader implications for political economy.48 
 The model now has the following two stages: In the first stage, the owners of 
each specific factor decide whether to contribute to the financing of the fixed costs of 
forming a lobby. The second stage reproduces the previous model where lobbies 
provide the government with their contribution schedules and then the government 
sets trade policy to maximize a weighted sum of political contributions and social 
welfare. 
 Let n now denote the actual number of lobbies formed. In the second stage of 
the game we take the number of lobbies as given and solve for the equilibrium 
policies, obtaining the result given by equation (8). It then remains to solve for the 
number of lobbies that form in the first stage. 
 Let oΩ and uΩ respectively be the equilibrium gross welfare of an organized 
group and of an unorganized group. 49 Also, letC be the equilibrium contribution by a 
lobby and let the fixed cost of lobby formation for the ith group of specific factors be 
denoted by iF . Then, this group will form a lobby if and only if iuo FC >−Ω−Ω . 
 Let the groups be indexed in ascending order of their fixed costs, such that 
 
 max121min FFFFFFF nn ≤<<<<≤ + ηLL  
 
                                                 
 
48 We follow Mitra’s (1999) approach in this section. 
 
49 These do not depend on n, since the equilibrium policies are independent of n by the assumption of 
concentration of ownership of the specific factors. 
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Take the case of a continuous number of lobbies, with the total mass of non-
numeraire goods normalized to unity, so that ]1,0[∈n . Then 0)( >′ nF . Let 
NB represent the net benefit from forming a lobby (net of contributions), with 
 
 CNB uo −Ω−Ω=          (14) 
 
Let )1()1( −−Π−Π=∆Π Euoo and )1()1( −−Π−Π=∆Π Euuu . The gross benefit is 
then: 
    
 uoGB Ω−Ω=  
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }


Π≥Π∆Π+Π−∆Π+Π
Π<Π∆Π−Π−∆Π+Π= −
−
)1(
)1(
uuuuoo
uuuuoo
if
if
αα
βα λ
   (15) 
 
For simplicity of exposition, we are assuming that an unorganized group may either 
gain or lose with respect to the previous period, whereas an organized group always 
gains.50 
 With truthful contributions, the equilibrium contribution by an organized 
group is given by ooo bC −Ω= , where ooo Cb −Ω= is the net-of-contributions 
welfare (determined in equilibrium). As in Mitra (1999), we can show that in 
equilibrium a lobby contributes just enough to compensate for the reduction in social 
                                                 
50 We do not explicitly include here the case where the sector has a loss if it is organized, but doing so 
would not qualitatively change the results, since the only difference is that in that case becoming 
organized reduces the loss instead of leading to a gain relative to the previous period. The important 
difference for our results is between sectors that lose and sectors that gain if they remain unorganized. 
In the appendix we do consider that case explicitly and provide the condition for the results of this 
section to hold under that scenario as well. 
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welfare brought about by its formation (see the Appendix for the proof).  Letting 
oW and uW denote welfare (the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus and tariff 
revenue) generated by an organized sector and by an unorganized sector respectively, 
we can write that condition as follows: 
 
 )( uo WWaC −−=               (16) 
 
We also have: 
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where ( ) )()()( uuuu pdppdups −= ; and 
 
 ( ) )()()( owooooo pmpppNsW −++∆Π+Π= α              (18) 
 
where we are assuming that )1(−Π≥Π uo , as mentioned above. From equations (14) 
and (16) to (18) we can obtain: 
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Since 0)( =′ nBN and 0)( >′ nF , there is a unique equilibrium with ∗n organized 
groups, where )( ∗= nFNB . 
 In the Appendix we show that for two sectors that are symmetric in all 
respects except that one has a loss and the other a gain of equal magnitude, the loser 
sector will have a higher benefit of forming a lobby, provided that the coefficient of 
loss aversion is large enough.51 The intuition is that the increase in income brought 
about by protection has a larger impact on utility for a sector that has a loss, and the 
additional protection associated with becoming organized is higher for the loser 
sector as well. The benefit of avoiding a loss also has a larger positive effect on social 
welfare and that tends to reduce the contribution that the lobby has to give to the 
government. Therefore, for a sufficiently high coefficient of loss aversion, these 
benefits of avoiding a loss, together with the higher tariff revenue (and thus lower 
contribution) associated with the higher increase in protection, will dominate the 
effect of a larger decrease in consumer surplus (which tends to increase the 
                                                 
51 The fact that unorganized industries also get protection under loss aversion is taken into account. 
Therefore, we show that, after accounting for this, the net benefit of forming a lobby is higher for a 
sector that has a loss. 
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contribution that the industry must give to the government). This result is stated in the 
following proposition (the exact condition is given in the appendix). 
  
Proposition 4. (Lobby formation and protection to declining industries): Consider 
two sectors that are symmetric in all respects except that one has a loss and the other 
a gain of similar magnitude. If the coefficient of loss aversion is sufficiently high, the 
net benefit of forming a lobby will be larger for the sector that loses. 
 
This helps to explain why declining industries usually get more protection 
(reinforcing the result obtained in Section 2.2), and can explain more generally why 
“losers” obtain most of the government support not only in the case of trade policy 
but also for other policy instruments such as production subsidies, tax relief, etc. 
 Consider the shocks that were mentioned in the previous section, such as a 
shock that increases the endowment of the specific factor used in one sector and 
decreases that of the factor used in the other sector; a technological shock that 
increases productivity in one sector and reduces productivity in the other; or a shock 
that increases the world price of one good and decreases the world price of the other. 
These shocks will cause the country to trade and lead to a loss for the import sector 
and a gain for the export sector in the absence of protection. Then, proposition 4 
implies that, for a sufficiently high loss aversion coefficient, the net benefit of 
forming a lobby will be higher for the importers than for the exporters. Consequently, 
for a fixed cost that is lower than the net benefit for the importers but higher than that 
of the exporters, importers will lobby for protection while exporters will not. These 
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results make more likely that trade policy will exhibit an anti-trade bias, the exact 
outcome depending on the fixed costs and net benefits of each sector. In particular, 
consider initially a symmetric equilibrium with a total mass of non-numeraire sectors 
normalized to one, and introduce a shock that increases the endowment of the specific 
factors used in sectors )2/1,0[∈n and decreases that of the factors used in sectors 
]1,2/1(∈n . Then, the first half of sectors become export sectors and the remaining 
ones import sectors. Given symmetry in the fixed costs of organization, we have that 
if the coefficient of loss aversion is sufficiently high, more import lobbies will form 
than export lobbies. Proposition 5 summarizes this result. 
 
Proposition 5. (Lobby formation and anti-trade bias): Consider a symmetric 
equilibrium with a total mass of non-numeraire goods normalized to one, and 
introduce a shock that increases the endowment of the specific factors used in the 
sectors )2/1,0[∈n and decreases that of the factors used in the sectors ]1,2/1(∈n . 
Assuming also symmetry in the fixed cost of forming a lobby, more import-competing 
lobbies will form than export ones provided that the coefficient of loss aversion is 
sufficiently high. 
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Chapter 3: Loss Aversion and Trade Policy-- Empirical    
Evidence 
 
 
In this Chapter we provide empirical evidence of the effects of loss aversion on trade 
policy. We focus initially on the protection equation and in section 3.4 we present 
evidence on loss aversion and lobby formation. 
 
3.1 Econometric Specification and Predictions 
 We apply a nonlinear regression procedure to directly estimate the structural 
parameters of the model and their standard errors. We describe the methodology in 
more detail in subsection 3.3.1. Under loss aversion, the model’s predictions for 
protection are given by equation (8), on the basis of which we specify the following 
equation to be estimated: 
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We decided to take ii ez ~/~  into the left-hand side for various reasons. First, the 
elasticities are likely to be measured with error. Second, both variables are potentially 
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endogenous.52 Finally, leaving ii ez ~/~ on the right-hand side would mean to have it 
interacted with all the right-hand-side terms and that might confound the effect that 
losses and gains have on protection, which is our main focus, as well as introduce 
potential collinearity problems. In equation (E1), iD  is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if the sector experiences a loss (i.e., if 0<∆Π i ) and zero otherwise. The 
use of that dummy allows us to estimate different coefficients for losses and gains, as 
predicted by the theory. We denote the parameters to be estimated by jγ , 
where 2,1,0=j , and the regression error term by iε . The error term is included to 
capture potential measurement error in the variables and other factors (not accounted 
for in the model) that may influence the determination of trade policy. Since 
Kahneman and Tversky estimated bothα andβ  to be 0.88, we set βα =  when we 
specify equation (E1).53 From equations (8) and (E1), we obtain the following 
predictions: 
 
 i) 00 ≥= aγ ; 
  ii) )1,0(1 ∈= βγ ; and  
 iii) 12 >= λγ . 
 
                                                 
52 They may vary with the price as protection changes. Having those variables on the left-hand side 
eliminates the need to either instrument or specify separate equations for them. The alternative 
approach of leaving both variables on the right hand side and specifying additional equations for them 
has the caveat that, as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) point out, it is difficult to come up with a sensible 
reduced specification for the elasticities. 
 
53 Later we relax this assumption. 
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The first prediction simply follows from the fact that the weight that the government 
places on social welfare should be non-negative. The second follows from the fact 
that, according to the theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), there is 
diminishing sensitivity and henceβ should be between zero and one. The last 
prediction is implied by the definition of loss aversion, according to which losses 
have a larger impact on value or utility than gains, and therefore the coefficient of 
loss aversion should be greater than one.  
 
3.2 Data 
 The data we use consists of 241 four digit SIC U.S. industries in 1983.54 
Protection is measured by the NTB coverage ratio. Even though the theory calls for 
the use of ad valorem tariffs, an argument in favor of the use of NTBs is that U.S. 
tariffs in 1983 were determined by multilateral (GATT) tariff negotiations, while the 
model assumes that the country can set its tariffs unilaterally. We should point out 
that the use of coverage ratios has the potential problem that it may understate or 
overstate protection; however, they are considered the best available measure of 
NTBs.55 The import elasticities come from Shiells et al. (1986), and were purged of 
the errors-in-variables problem by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) (henceforth 
                                                 
54 Part of the data was kindly provided by Kishore Gawande, and the rest was obtained from the 
Annual Survey of Manufactures. 
  
55 Trefler (1993) found a high correlation (0.78) between ad valorem tariffs and their coverage ratios, 
providing some evidence in favor of the use of coverage ratios. A more detailed discussion on the use 
of NTB coverage ratios can be found in Goldberg and Maggi (1999). Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999), among others, also use NTB coverage ratios as the measure 
for protection. 
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GB).56 Z is measured as the gross output to import ratio. The politically organized 
industries were determined by GB (2000) by regressing the ratio of PAC spending to 
value added on bilateral import penetration (for five major partners) interacted with 
twenty two-digit SIC dummies. Those industries for which the predicted value of the 
dependent variable was positive were considered organized in the trade arena. The 
union of the sets of organized industries obtained for the five partners was then 
taken.57 The terms that measure losses and gains were obtained using data from the 
Annual Survey of Manufactures (henceforth ASM). The numerator of 
( ) ( )ββ )1(1 −−∆Π ii E  was measured as the absolute value of the change in value added 
(VA) between 1982 and 1983 (raised to the power of 1−β ). We use the change in 
VA as a measure of the change in the industry’s reward to the specific factors. The 
term in brackets in the denominator was defined as VA in 1982.58 We examined the 
sensitivity of the results to modifying the measures for the loss and gain variables 
(including using a longer period to calculate them) as we discuss in the next section. 
Finally, the value of iD was determined according to whether the change in VA 
between 1982 and 1983 for industry i was negative or positive. (When we use a 
longer period to measure the losses and gains this dummy variable is redefined 
accordingly). 
                                                 
56 A description of the procedure can be found in GB (2000). 
 
57 The purpose of this is to identify import-related lobbying. Since aggregate imports were used in z, 
bilateral import penetration ratios are used here. 
 
58 The model strictly calls for payments to the industry’s specific factors plus labor income in the 
denominator, but since we do not have a measure of labor income that the members of an industry may 
have from working elsewhere, we use VA as the best available proxy for E . 
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3.3 Estimation 
3.3.1 Methodology 
 The right-hand side expression of the protection equation (E1) is nonlinear in 
both variables and parameters. In addition, the right-hand side variables may be 
correlated with the error term due to potential endogeneity of the political 
organization variable and the magnitude of the loss/gain of each industry (since these 
variables may change in response to changes in prices generated by protection), and 
to measurement error associated with I due to possible misclassification. 
Consequently, we estimate (E1) using nonlinear two-stage least squares (NL2SLS).59  
 The instruments that we use include mainly industry characteristics, such as 
the capital-labor ratio interacted with industry-group dummies; the fraction of 
workers classified as unskilled, scientists and engineers, and managerial; output per 
firm (scale); the four-firm concentration ratio; the Herfindahl index of firm 
concentration; the share of output sold as intermediate goods; and a Herfindahl 
measure of intermediate-goods-output buyer concentration. These variables are 
included to instrument for the political organization variable, as has been done by 
other authors under the argument that they are correlated with that variable but not 
with the regression error. They can also be instruments for the loss/gain variables, 
since higher concentration or capital and skilled-labor intensity may be associated 
with larger profits, which appear in the denominator as the level of VA. But due to 
the presence of the loss/gain variables we also include the change in the wage 
                                                 
59 According to that procedure the instruments can include not only the levels of the exogenous 
variables, but also their quadratic terms and cross-products. GMM results are also reported later. 
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between 1983 and 1982 (in percentage terms),60 and the dummy variable that equals 
one if the industry’s change in VA is negative and zero if it is positive. 61,62 The 
validity of the instruments was evaluated using an overidentifying restrictions test 
(described below). Also, we reestimate the model excluding some instruments that 
could be suspected to be at least “somewhat endogenous”, as we report later. 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 The results of the NL2SLS estimation are presented in Table 1. All three 
parameters -- λβ , and a-- are statistically significant at the 1% level (individually and 
jointly). Moreover, the predictions i) to iii) (described in section 3.1) are satisfied 
even though no restrictions were imposed in the estimation. The estimated value ofβ  
is 0.81, which is positive and lower than one (consistent with diminishing sensitivity), 
and close to the value of 0.88 obtained by Kahneman and Tversky (1992). 
Furthermore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 88.0=β  (the probability was 
0.25). We also should point out that we can reject the null hypothesis that 1=β  (in 
                                                 
60 This variable was obtained as the ratio of payments to employees divided by the number of 
employees, using data from the ASM. We should point out that, although one might worry that wages 
could respond to changes in good prices, some authors have found that for the U.S. most of the 
adjustment takes place through employment, and that the impact on the return to labor is quite small. 
See Revenga (1992) and Grossman (1986).  
 
61 The dummy is included to address an issue arising from the nonlinearity, since the protection 
equation is decreasing in the absolute value of the change in VA (i.e., it increases when the change in 
VA lies in the interval )0,(−∞ and it decreases when it lies in ),0( ∞ ) and the limit for the loss and gain 
terms is being defined at zero.  
 
62 Since including all the possible cross products would imply having too many instruments we include 
the linear terms, the squared terms, and the interaction of the linear terms with the dummy, scale, the 
Herfindahl index and the share of output sold as intermediate goods (this choice was based on the 
statistical significance of these variables in the first stage regressions). We estimated the model 
including interactions with other variables and the results were not significantly affected. 
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this regression and the regressions presented in all the following tables), at the 1% 
level. The parameterλ is estimated to be 1.95, which is greater than one, providing 
evidence in favor of loss aversion (losses have a larger effect on protection than 
gains). We also tested for loss aversion ( 1>λ ) against the null hypothesis that 1=λ . 
We can reject the null hypothesis of no loss aversion, in the regression presented in 
Table 1 and the following tables, at least at the 10% level. Moreover, the estimated 
value of λ is close to 2, consistent with the results of the previous literature. Also, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that 25.2=λ , as estimated by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1992) (the probability was 0.67).  
 Finally, the estimated value of a is positive, as expected, and lower than the 
value obtained by GB (2000). GB’s estimate of a implies that the share of the total 
weight given to social welfare gross of contributions is over 0.999. The estimate of 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) implies a weight of 0.986.63 These estimates of a are 
considered very large and at odds with the view that trade policy is determined 
largely by political influences (Gawande and Krishna [2003]). On the other hand, our 
estimates of a imply a significantly larger weight on contributions than on social 
welfare, suggesting that protection is indeed “sold”, but implying a very low weight 
on social welfare. Our estimates vary between 0.02 (Table 1) and 0.06 (Table 3) 
                                                 
 
63 Those weights refer to social welfare gross of contributions. Both estimates imply nearly equal 
weight on aggregate welfare net of contributions than on contributions. If 1a is the weight on aggregate 
contributions and 2a is the weight on aggregate welfare net of contributions, then )/( 212 aaaa −=  
(see GH [1994] or GB (2000)). GB’s and Goldberg and Maggi’s estimates imply that the share of 
weight attached to contributions ( )/( 211 aaa + ) is 0.500 and 0.504, respectively. 
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depending on the estimation procedure. They imply a share of weight attached to 
contributions between 0.94 and 0.98.64  
 
Table 1: NL2SLS Estimates 
Parameter Value Std. Error 
β  0.808*** 0.063 
λ  1.948*** 0.714 
a 0.022*** 0.007 
R2 0.154 
Adj. R2 0.147 
Log-likelihood -1909.286 
Observations 241 
               *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 In addition, we tested the hypotheses that the composite coefficients of the 
variables ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 11 )1(1)1( ~~ γγ −−− Π−Π×× iiiiiii EppDI , 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 11 )1(1)1( ~~ γγ −−− Π−Π× iiiiii EppD  and 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 11 )1(1)1(~~)1( γγ −−−Π−Π×−× iiiiiii EppDI are significant: 
  
 1) 011: 21
0
0 =××= λβγγγ aH ; 
                                                 
64 We should also mention that, since some NTBs do not generate revenue and are therefore more 
costly in terms of social welfare, the value of a that one would get from the estimation when the policy 
is an NTB could be very different than when the policy is a tariff, and hence cannot be interpreted 
identically. Thus, our main focus has been to compare our value of a with the ones obtained by 
previous authors that also used NTBs. However, it is worth noting that Mitra (2002) performs 
estimations of the GH (1994) model for Turkey using both tariffs and NTBs, and the estimates of a do 
not differ much between each other.  
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 2) 0: 210 =×=′ λβγγH ; and 
 3) 011: 1
0
0 =×=″ βγγ aH . 
 
The hypotheses involve nonlinear restrictions and therefore we used a Wald test. All 
three hypotheses can be rejected. The probabilities were 0.001 and 0.013 for 1) and 
2), respectively. The fact that 1) is rejected implies that 3) is also rejected. 65 
 We should point out that, although the dependent variable is censored below 
zero and we did not impose restrictions to prevent the predicted values from being 
negative, we found that the model’s predicted values are never negative. 
 We also estimated the model without setting βα = . The estimated value ofβ  
was 0.82 andα was 0.69. Although the value of α  was lower than the one of β , the 
former was estimated with less precision (the standard error was 0.296, compared to 
only 0.065 for β ).66 Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that βα = , 
providing support for our assumption that both parameters are equal when we 
estimated equation (E1). The evidence of diminishing sensitivity for both gains and 
losses provides an important distinction from the case of a concave utility. A concave 
utility predicts increasing sensitivity to losses, and in that case we would expect to 
find 1>β . Again, we can reject the null hypothesis that 1=β  at the 1% level. 
 
                                                 
65 We also carried out a White test for heteroskedasticity. The probability was 0.26, indicating that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
 
66 The values of the other parameters do not vary much (the value ofλ was 2.29 and a was estimated to 
be 0.03). These results are reported in the Appendix. 
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3.3.3 Robustness 
 We examined the sensitivity of the results to changing the measure of the loss 
and gain variables. Instead of using VA, we used VA excluding payments to non-
production workers (in both the numerator and denominator of 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )ββ )1(1)1( ~~ −−− Π−Π iiiii Epp ). An argument for the use of this measure is that non-
production workers may be considered more mobile.67 The results still hold. All three 
parameters were statistically significant at the 1% level. The parameterβ  was equal 
to 0.84, λ was 1.37 (which is lower than the previous value but still greater than one, 
consistent with loss aversion), and a was 0.02. Moreover, because policies might take 
longer to respond to changes in industry variables, we also performed the estimation 
using a longer period of time to define the losses and gains. Instead of using the 
change in VA between 1982 and 1983 we used the change between 1979 and 1983. 68 
All parameters are significant at the 1% level, and we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the loss aversion parameters are equal to the values estimated by Kahneman and 
Tversky (that is, 88.0=β and 25.2=λ ). The value ofλ was 2.23, which is again in 
the neighborhood of two, as in the results of the previous section.69 However, the R2 
                                                 
 
67 The argument for the use of VA without excluding payments to non-production workers, however, is 
that the owners of capital in an industry may also own the skilled labor. 
 
68 To determine the change in VA between 1979 and 1983 we calculated a rate of growth using the 
percentage changes between 1979-80, 1980-81 and 1982-1983, since due to a change in reporting 
instructions the data of 1983 and 1982 are not directly comparable to those of previous years. Since 
( ) ( ) ( ) )1(1)1()1(1 / −−−−− ∆Π=∆Π EEE βββ  and the percentage change in VA for the period gives us a 
measure of term inside brackets in the numerator, we then divide the numerator (raised to the power of 
1−β ) by the initial income, measured as VA in 1979. Instruments that involve changes were 
redefined accordingly. 
 
69 The estimate of a is also unchanged with respect to the 1982-1983 estimation. 
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is lower than the one obtained in the original estimation (0.13 versus 0.15), which 
indicates that the data favors the shorter period to measure the losses and gains. 
 In addition, we evaluated the sensitivity of the results to alternative treatments 
of the political organization variable. Given that we obtained predictions on the 
lobbying side by endogenizing lobby formation and in Section 3.4 we estimate a 
political organization equation, in that section we also discuss the results that we 
obtain by replacing the data on I with an ex post classification based on that 
regression.70 
 We performed a test of overidentifying restrictions to assess the validity of the 
instruments and we cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that the excluded 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error and correctly excluded from the estimated 
equation, providing support for the assumption that the set of instruments is valid. 71 
As we mentioned above, however, some of the instruments can be suspected to be 
endogenous, in particular the capital-labor ratios and the fraction of workers in each 
category.72 We reestimated equation (E1) excluding those variables from the set of 
                                                 
 
70 Before using those results, we also experimented with the alternative of estimating a probit 
regression of I on the instruments and replacing the fitted values from that regression into the right-
hand side of equation (E1) before doing the nonlinear estimation. The estimated values of λβ ,  and a 
were 0.84, 2.07 and 0.02, respectively, which are very close to those from the previous estimation. 
Second, we also preformed an estimation treating I as econometrically exogenous. The estimated β  
was 0.75, λ was 2.28 and a was 0.03 (all were statistically significant at least at the 5% level). Again, 
the results do not vary significantly.  
 
71 The statistic was 102.55 and the corresponding Chi-squared value was 104.13. The statistic was 
calculated as the number of observations times the uncentered R2 from a regression of the NL2SLS 
residuals on the instruments. The number of degrees of freedom for the Chi-squared equals the number 
of overidentifying restrictions. See Wooldridge (2001), p.122-124. 
 
72 Factor shares could be endogenous because they may respond to price changes induced by 
protection. 
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instruments. The estimated values of λβ ,  and a were 0.84, 1.72 and 0.02, 
respectively, which do not differ much from the ones previously obtained. Also, all 
three coefficients were significant at the 1% level. 
 Furthermore, although one could expect the right-hand side variables in 
equation (E1) to be potentially endogenous, we performed a Hausman test to evaluate 
such possible endogeneity.73 We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the right-hand 
side variables are exogenous. The results of estimating the model treating the right-
hand side variables as exogenous (by nonlinear least squares) are reported in Table 2. 
They are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained using instrumental 
variables. In particular, the coefficient of loss aversion is estimated to be 2.39, which 
is again greater than one, as predicted by loss aversion, and close to 2, consistent with 
the findings of the previous literature.  
 
Table 2: NLLS Estimates 
Parameter Value Std. Error 
β  0.774*** 0.056 
λ  2.386*** 0.918 
a 0.032*** 0.011 
R2 0.160 
Adj. R2 0.153 
Log-likelihood -1908.380 
Observations 241 
                *** Significant at 1%. 
 
                                                 
 
73 The test was carried out by including the residuals obtained from regressing each of the potentially 
endogenous variables on the instruments into the equation to be estimated by NLLS and then testing 
for the joint significance of those residuals. 
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 Nonetheless, an argument for the use instrumental variables is that when we 
applied the same Hausman test to an estimation that is linear in the parameters we did 
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. The linear estimation (linear in the 
parameters although not in the regressors) was performed using two-stage least 
squares with the same set of instruments described earlier. The equation that we 
estimate is: 
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The loss and gain terms were defined assuming 88.0=β , based on Kahneman and 
Tversky (1992) and their coefficients were found to be positive, as expected, and 
statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% level.74 This specification included 
again four terms related to the losses/gains (one for the loss interacted with I, one for 
the loss interacted with (1- I ) and two corresponding terms for the gains).75   
                                                 
74 We also experimented with the value of β that we obtained in the nonlinear estimation, 0.81, and the 
results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar. According to the theory, β should be between zero 
and one. Hence, to study the sensitivity of the results to the value of that parameter, we did the linear 
estimation replacing β with values starting with 0.1 and adding 0.1 each time until 0.9 was reached (a 
value of 0.95 was also used). The value of β that was associated with the highest R2 was 0.8 (the R2 
decreases monotonically as we either increase or decrease β from 0.8). Again, this value is close to the 
one estimated by Kahneman and Tversky (1992). 
 
75 The results are reported in the Appendix. This is equivalent to having the losses and gains interacted 
with I and then not interacted (instead of interacted with 1- I ), in the sense that they are both structural 
estimations, and only the interpretation of the coefficient changes.  The reason why we did not follow 
the other possibility is that in that case multicollinearity problems are more likely to arise (the 
correlation between the term interacted with I and the one not interacted was 0.97 for losses and 0.88 
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 With the linear estimation we do not immediately obtain the estimate of the 
coefficient of loss aversion (λ ), but it is still possible to obtain it as the ratio of the 
loss and gain coefficients (according to the model, the ratio is equal toλ for both the 
organized and the unorganized industries, i.e., the terms interacted with I and 1- I ). 
We found that ratio to be equal to 2.85 for unorganized industries and 2.10 for 
organized industries, providing evidence in favor of loss aversion. Moreover, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that those two ratios are equal, as predicted by the 
model (the probability was 0.68). A Wald test to determine whether the coefficients 
on losses and gains are different was also carried out, and we rejected the null 
hypothesis that they are equal for both organized and unorganized industries, with 
probabilities 0.017 and 0.037, respectively. This result is necessary for loss aversion 
to hold. 
 As a final robustness test, we report in Table 3 the results obtained when we 
estimated equation (E1) by GMM. All three coefficients are again significant at the 
1% level and do not differ much from those previously reported. λβ ,  and a were 
estimated to be 0.60, 2.05 and 0.06, respectively, being consistent with the theoretical 
predictions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
for gains, while the correlation between the term interacted with I and that interacted with 1- I was 
only -0.06 for losses and -0.14 for gains). 
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Table 3: GMM Estimates 
Parameter Value Std. Error 
β  0.602*** 0.078 
λ  2.049*** 0.725 
a 0.058*** 0.013 
R2 0.135 
J-statistic 0.227 
Observations 241 
               *** Significant at 1%. 
 
3.3.4 Quantification 
 In this subsection we use the results from the NL2SLS estimation to quantify 
the effects of changes in VA on protection, comparing the effects of losses and gains 
as well as the cases of organized and unorganized industries.  
 Figure 2 plots the fitted values of the protection variable (given by 
NTB/(1+NTB)) against the change in VA (in billions of dollars), and includes a 
second order polynomial trend line. We can see that higher protection will be given to 
industries with smaller changes (for both losses and gains), due to diminishing 
sensitivity. 76 
 To compare the effects of losses and gains on protection, we calculated the 
fitted values of protection that industries with losses would receive according to the 
estimated values of the parameters, and also the values of protection that those same 
                                                 
76 We should point out that since there is a direct effect on utility generated by changes in income with 
respect to its reference level, if a sector experiences a gain, loss aversion leads to an increase in 
protection. (Nonetheless, for two sectors that are symmetric in everything except that one had a loss 
and the other a gain of equal magnitude, loss aversion leads to higher protection for the sector that 
experienced a loss).  
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industries would receive had their losses been gains instead. 77 It can be seen in 
Figure 3 that losses are associated with higher protection than gains (everything else 
equal), and that the absolute value of the difference decreases with the value of the 
change in VA. 
 
Figure 2: All Industries 
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Figure 3: Losses versus Gains 
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77 That is, multiplying the changes in VA by minus one and computing the protection values using the 
parameters corresponding to gains, keeping everything else equal 
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 Whereas Figure 2 includes all industries, Figure 4 plots the fitted values of 
protection only for the organized industries, and Figure 5 plots the values of 
protection that would correspond to those same industries if they were unorganized.78 
We include these additional figures because under loss aversion we have both a 
political economy motive and a social welfare motive for protection, and we want to 
quantify how important the latter is relative to the former. We can see that the 
unorganized industries get much lower protection,79 indicating that the political 
economy motive for protection is much more significant than the social welfare 
motive that arises from loss aversion. 
 
Figure 4: Organized Industries 
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78  That is, changing only the value of the political organization variable from one to zero. 
 
79 Note that the scale of the vertical axis is different in both figures. 
 
  60 
 
Figure 5: Unorganized Industries 
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 Row (1) of Table 4 shows the predicted value of protection calculated at the 
mean value of VA in 1982 and ez / and assuming that the change in VA is 1%, for 
gains and losses in organized and unorganized industries. Row (2) shows the 
predicted value of protection assuming a 10% change in VA.80 We can see that the 
increase in protection (shown in row (3)) when we compare the cases of a 1% change 
and 10% change in VA is roughly twice as much if the change is negative than if it is 
positive (for both organized and unorganized industries). The table also shows that, 
everything else equal, an organized industry gets much higher protection than an 
unorganized one, as we mentioned before, and that losses are associated with higher 
protection than gains (everything else equal). 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 We should point out that a 10 percent change is the median change in VA for the whole sample, and 
it is very close to the median changes for both organized and unorganized industries, which are 11 
percent and 9 percent, respectively. Also, a 10% change is associated with lower protection than a 1% 
change due to diminishing sensitivity. 
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Table 4: NTB/(1+NTB) 
 Organized  Unorganized 
 Loss Gain  Loss Gain 
(1) 1% change in VA 0.9683 0.6549  0.0139 0.0071 
(2) 10% change in VA 0.7382 0.5368  0.0089 0.0046 
(3) Increase: (1) – (2) 0.2301 0.1181  0.0050 0.0025 
 
 
3.3.5 Model Selection 
 Table 5 presents information criteria corresponding to our model and the 
original GH model (i.e., dropping the four regressors measuring the losses and gains 
from the right-hand side of (E1)).81 Lower values are preferred and thus both the 
Akaike (AIC) and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) provide evidence in favor 
of our model. 
 Since in the theoretical model we made the assumption of concentration of 
ownership of the specific factors, two additional model comparisons may be 
worthwhile. The first compares the original GH model without imposing that 
assumption (which we will call the unrestricted GH model)82 to the GH model 
                                                 
81 The prediction for protection in the GH model (with ez / in the left-hand side) is given by ( ) iiiii Iaeztt )1()~~/()~1(~ =+ . The coefficient of the political organization variable in the estimation of 
the GH model was positive (as expected) and significant at the 1% level. 
 
82 In that case the protection equation is: ( ) ( ) ( ))()(1)~~/()~1(~ LLiLiiii aIaeztt ααα +−+=+ , 
where Lα denotes the proportion of the population that is organized. 
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including the assumption (the information appearing in Table 5 corresponds to the 
last case). The second compares our loss aversion model to the unrestricted GH 
model, which is a comparison of nonnested models.  
 
Table 5: Information Criteria (NL2SLS Estimation) 
Criterion Loss Aversion GH 1994 
Akaike1 15.870 16.077 
Schwarz2 15.913 16.091 
Log Likelihood -1909.286 -1936.237 
           1. AIC = -2L/n + 2k/n 
           2. SIC = -2L/n + k logn/n 
 
 We estimated the unrestricted GH model by 2SLS, and obtained a value of 
16.026 for the AIC and 16.055 for the SIC.83 These values are lower than those of the 
GH model that includes the assumption of concentration (which appear in Table 5). 
Hence, both information criteria favor the unrestricted GH model over the restricted 
one.  
 Since the unrestricted GH model was estimated by a linear regression 
procedure (linear in the parameters), we compare it to the linear estimation of the 
model with loss aversion, which was discussed in the previous subsection. The 
models are nonnested, and therefore we use the J test proposed by Davidson and 
                                                 
83 With ez / in the left-hand side the unrestricted model is equal to the restricted one plus a constant 
term, and both models can be nested. 
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MacKinnon (1993). We find that the data also favors our model over the unrestricted 
GH model.84 
 
3.4 Evidence on Loss Aversion and Lobby Formation 
 In this section we estimate a lobby formation equation based on the 
predictions obtained in section 2.4, and test for the presence of loss aversion in lobby 
formation. Equation (19) shows the net benefit of forming a lobby. We do not 
perform structural estimation because we do not have information that allows us to 
measure the effects that an industry that becomes organized generates on producer 
surplus, consumer surplus and tariff revenue. The equation that we estimate is given 
by: 
 
( ) ( ) iiiiii
i
i
i
i
ii y
m
e
E
d
E
dI µϕδδδδδ β
β
β
β
++++


 ∆Π×−+


 ∆Π×+= −
−
−
−
X43)1(
1
2)1(
1
10
)(
)1(
)(
   
                    (E3) 
 
In equation (E3), the dependent variable is the political organization dummy (see 
section 3.2). A prediction of the model is that, for a sufficiently high coefficient of 
loss aversion, a sector that experiences a loss will be more likely to form a lobby than 
one that experiences a gain, because the direct effect on utility as well as the extra 
                                                 
 
84 When we include the fitted values from the unrestricted GH model in the estimation of our model we 
find that they are not statistically significant (the probability was 0.37), and thus we reject the GH 
model. On the other hand, when we include the fitted values from the loss aversion model in the GH 
model estimation we find that they are significant (the probability was 0.00), and therefore we cannot 
reject the loss aversion model. 
  64 
 
protection associated with becoming organized are higher for the sector with a loss. 
Since in a one year period there may not be sufficient activity in terms of lobby 
formation, we measure the losses and gains over the period 1979-1983. Thus, id is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the change in VA between 1979 and 1983 was 
negative and zero if it was positive.85 Given that the amount of deadweight loss also 
affects the net benefit of forming a lobby, we include in (E3) the elasticity of import 
demand ( ie ), and the import-output ratio ( ii ym / ).
86 The vector iX  contains measures 
of concentration traditionally used in the political economy literature and that could 
also proxy to some extent for the fixed cost of forming a lobby, as well as factor 
shares. The error term is iµ . More precisely, iX includes the four-firm concentration 
ratio (Conc4), the Herfindahl index of concentration (LHerf), the capital-labor ratio 
interacted by industry group dummies (KL_Cap, KL_Res and KL_Mfg), and the 
fraction of workers classified as unskilled (P_Uns), scientists and engineers (P_Sci), 
and managerial (P_Man).87 
 Since the dependent variable is binary and some of the right-hand side 
variables are potentially endogenous (the loss/gain, the elasticity and the import-
                                                 
85 We determine the change in VA between 1979 and 1983 in the way described in subsection 3.3.3.  
 
86 We would expect this variable to negatively affect the probability of forming a lobby since higher 
imports imply a larger social cost from an increase in protection and a lower output means that the 
industry has less to gain from higher protection. 
 
87 We should point out that since the GH (1994) model treats lobby formation as exogenous, the fact 
that we test predictions obtained by endogenizing lobby formation differs from Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999), who estimate a separate equation for I but only including variables of the kind that we have on 
the iX vector, and from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), who estimate an equation for 
contributions but not for lobby formation. They allow for the political organization variable to be 
potentially endogenous in the estimation of the protection equation but they do not test any predictions 
on political organization obtained from endogenizing lobby formation. 
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output ratio), we estimate a probit model using the two-stage conditional maximum 
likelihood (2SCML) estimator proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988).88 We use the 
same instruments as before.89 The results appear on Table 6, which includes two 
estimations: one in which we replaceβ  by 0.88 (the value estimated by Kahneman 
and Tversky [1992]), and the other setting 81.0=β (the value that we obtained in the 
nonlinear estimation of the protection equation). Both regressions give similar results. 
We found that we cannot reject the null hypotheses of exogeneity of the right-hand 
side variables.90 The main predictions that we want to test are that losses and gains 
are statistically significant and that losses have a larger impact on lobby formation 
than gains, that is 21 δδ > . As predicted, we find that both losses and gains are 
significant at the 5% level, and that losses have a larger coefficient than gains, 
consistent with loss aversion. The ratio of those coefficients was 1.94 when 88.0=β , 
suggesting a coefficient of loss aversion that is again in the neighborhood of 2. 
Moreover, we can not reject the null hypotheses that the ratio is equal to 2.25, as 
estimated by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) (the probability was 0.77). 
When 81.0=β , the ratio was 1.76, which is lower but still not statistically different 
from 2.25 (the probability was 0.56). Thus, we find evidence of loss aversion in lobby 
                                                 
 
88 According to that procedure, in the first stage we regress the potentially endogenous variables on the 
instruments (by least squares) and then we estimate the probit model including the residuals from the 
first stage as additional regressors. A convenient feature of the procedure is that we can test for 
exogeneity by evaluating the statistical significance of those residuals. 
 
89 Changes between 1983 and 1982 were replaced by changes between 1983 and 1979. We should 
point out that all the first-stage R-squares were greater than 0.40. 
 
90 The residuals added to the probit regressions were not statistically significant (neither individually 
nor jointly). 
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formation. An industry is more likely to become organized if it experiences a loss, 
everything else equal. This provides additional empirical support for our theoretical 
result that loss aversion allows us to explain why declining industries get most of the 
protection.91 
 As we mentioned in section 3.3.3, we did a final sensitivity analysis by 
reestimating the protection equation (E1) using a political organization variable 
obtained from the estimation of equation (E3). We classified an industry as organized 
if its predicted probability of being organized from the probit estimation was at least 
0.6.92 The estimated values of λβ ,  and a were 0.84, 2.15 and 0.02, respectively, 
which are very close to the results from section 3.3 (the results are shown in Table 10 
in the Appendix). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
91 As for the other variables, the import-output ratio has the expected sign and it is significant at the 
10% level. The elasticity has a positive coefficient (contrary to what we would expect) but is not 
significant. Regarding the variables included in iX , the literature does not yield unambiguous sign 
predictions, as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) point out. According to our results the proportions of 
scientists and engineers and managers, as well as the capital-labor ratios (except for one group of 
industries) are statistically significant.  
 
92 This gives us 149 organized industries (see the Appendix for the list). We should point out that using 
88.0=β (the value obtained by Kahneman and Tversky [1992]) or 81.0=β (the value that we 
obtained when we estimated the protection equation) gives exactly the same results in terms of which 
industries are classified as organized. 
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Table 6: Probit (2SCML) Estimates 
 880.=β   810.=β  
Variable Coef. S. Error  Coef. S. Error 
Constant     -0.741 1.825     -0.747 1.831 
Loss1      0.219** 0.088      0.167** 0.068 
Gain2      0.113** 0.058      0.095** 0.047 
e      0.631 0.572      0.615 0.573 
m/y    -2.023* 1.156     -1.926* 1.146 
Conc4    -0.756 1.312     -0.737 1.311 
P_Uns    -2.040 3.065     -2.036 3.085 
P_Sci    11.837*** 3.659     11.736*** 3.651 
P_Man    -6.118* 3.443     -6.006* 3.437 
KL_Cap      0.014 0.023      0.015 0.023 
KL_Res      0.514*** 0.105      0.512*** 0.105 
KL_Mfg      0.110** 0.051      0.111** 0.052 
LHerf     -0.074 0.246     -0.072 0.246 
Log Likelihood -109.67  -109.61 
IR  3 0.259 0.259 
RI
3 0.202  0.203 
McFadden R2 0.274  0.274 
Observations 241  241 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
1. Loss = ( )ββ )1(1)( −−∆Π× iii Ed ; 2. Gain = ( )ββ )1(1)()1( −−∆Π×− iii Ed ; 3. Measures of predictive 
performance defined in Betancourt and Clague (1981). These are measures of information that 
reflect not only whether the predictions are right or wrong but also their degree of certainty. For 
instance, in the dichotomous case, more credit (discredit) is given to a correct (incorrect) prediction 
that is close to 1 or 0 than to one that is close to 0.5. RI also corrects for the degrees of freedom. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
 
We study the effects of loss aversion on trade policy determination and use it to 
explain some important and puzzling features of trade policy. An important question 
concerning trade policy is why such a disproportionate amount of protection is given 
to declining industries. We show that if individual preferences exhibit loss aversion, 
sectors in which profitability is declining will receive higher protection. Moreover, by 
endogenizing lobby formation, we show that an industry will be more likely to 
become organized and lobby for protection if it has a loss.  
 In addition, as Rodrik (1995) points out, it constitutes an important puzzle the 
fact that trade policy is typically biased in favor of import competing sectors, and is 
therefore trade restricting rather than trade promoting. The current leading political 
economy model of trade protection, due to Grossman and Helpman (1994), cannot 
explain the anti-trade bias in trade policy and, in fact, under some symmetry 
assumptions predicts a pro-trade bias. We show that if the coefficient of loss aversion 
is sufficiently large, there will be an anti-trade bias under neutral assumptions. The 
cases in which symmetry is not imposed are also analyzed, leading to qualitatively 
similar conclusions. The results hold for a variety of shocks that lead the country to 
trade with the rest of the world. They also hold for two large countries even after the 
terms-of-trade motive for protection is removed. By allowing lobby formation to be 
endogenous, we then show that for a sufficiently high coefficient of loss aversion, 
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import-competing sectors will be more likely to form a lobby than export sectors, 
which reinforces the anti-trade bias result. 
 We use a nonlinear regression procedure to directly estimate the parameters of 
the model and test its predictions. We find empirical support for the model and we 
obtain estimates of the parameters that are very similar to those estimated by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) using experimental data. Losses are found to have a 
larger impact on protection than gains, and we obtain estimates of the coefficient of 
loss aversion that are about 2. The results are also consistent with diminishing 
sensitivity to income changes for both gains and losses. By testing for diminishing 
sensitivity and estimating the corresponding parameter, this dissertation also 
contributes to the literature on behavioral economics, since diminishing sensitivity for 
both gains and losses constitutes an important distinction from the case of risk 
aversion. To our knowledge, no previous paper has provided econometric estimates 
from non-experimental data of all the parameters of the value function proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992). We also find that the data favors our model over the 
GH model. These results contrast with those of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) 
and Goldberg and Maggi (1999), who find that the introduction of additional 
variables in the estimation of the GH model does not significantly improve its 
explanatory power. Our approach differs from theirs, however, in that we have a well-
specified alternative hypothesis.  
 In addition, we estimate a Probit equation on political organization using a 
two-stage conditional maximum likelihood estimator and we find evidence of loss 
aversion in lobby formation, consistent with our theoretical prediction. This result 
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highlights the importance of loss aversion more broadly for political economy issues, 
since under the pressure-group approach, special interest groups that spend more on 
lobbying should get larger support from the government (other things equal), and 
because one would expect the bigger and expanding industries to be in a better 
position to finance lobbying expenditures, the fact that declining industries appear to 
be much more successful at playing the political system for government support 
seems paradoxical. Loss aversion provides an explanation for this by implying that 
losers will have a larger incentive to become politically organized, and our empirical 
results support this prediction. This finding may apply not only to trade policy but to 
other policy instruments such as production subsidies, minimum price supports. It 
could also have implications for the long-run growth of an economy, since higher 
protection for declining sectors may weaken the movement of resources toward more 
profitable and dynamic sectors, particularly if governments are very responsive to 
political pressures by domestic lobbies. 
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Appendix A: Technical Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
A.1 Equilibrium Policies 
 
 First, we derive the equilibrium policies for the organized sectors. Given that 
there is no interaction between lobbies, the condition that, for every lobby i, the 
equilibrium price vector maximizes the joint welfare of that lobby (net of 
contributions) and the government (condition (c) on footnote 23), implies that: 
 
 { } { } )()()()()()(maxarg 000 pp aWpWaWpCpCpWp iiiiiiiii +=++−≡      (A1) 
 
The first-order condition is: 
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Using (5), (7) and (A2) we can obtain the equilibrium policies for Li∈ : 
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where ∗∗−= iiii pppt /)~(~ is the equilibrium ad valorem trade tax or subsidy for Li∈ , 
)~(/)~(~ iiiii pmpyz = is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports (negative 
for exports) and )~(/~)~(~ iiiiii pmppme ′−= is the elasticity of import demand (defined 
to be positive) or export supply (defined to be negative). 
 In the case of the unorganized sectors, the first-order condition (A2) becomes: 
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Using (7) and (A4) we can obtain, for Li∉ : 
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Using (A3) and (A5) we can write a general equation for the equilibrium policies, 
which is given by equation (8) in the text. 
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A.2 Anti-Trade Bias (Small Economy) 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 Consider two sectors, i and j, such that IIIeeezzz jijiji ====== ,, and 
)1()1()1( −−− == EEE ji . Let 0<∆Π i , 0>∆Π j and i∆Π = ∆Π=∆Π j . From equation 
(8) we have:93 
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Since 1>λ , (A6) implies that ji tt ~~ > . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 Using equation (A3) we have that protection in sector 2 will exceed protection 
in sector 1 if and only if:  
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which, after invoking symmetry and simplifying, becomes equation (10) in text.94 
                                                 
93 We also use βα = . 
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A.3 Loss Aversion and Lobby Formation 
 
Equilibrium Contribution 
 Recall that with truthful contributions, the equilibrium contribution by an 
organized group when there are n organized groups is given by ooo bC −Ω= , where 
ooo Cb −Ω= is the net-of-contributions welfare (determined in equilibrium). To 
calculate the equilibrium contribution by an organized group, we ask what will 
happen if a small number of sectors, of measure n∆ , decide to defect. Then the 
policymaker obtains: 
 
 [ ] )()( nnaWbnnG ooD ∆−+−Ω∆−=     (A7) 
 
where the first term represents contributions and the second represents social welfare 
weighted by a. 
 The equilibrium policymaker’s welfare is: 
 
 [ ] )(naWbnG oo +−Ω=       (A8) 
 
(A7) and (A8) must be equal for n∆ small enough. Equating them and taking the limit 
as 0→∆n we obtain: 
 
                                                                                                                                           
94 We also use )1(2
)1(
1
)1( −−− == EEE , given symmetry. 
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 Wab oo ′+Ω=                  (A9) 
 
Replacing (A9) into the expression for the contribution, we have: 
 
 )(nWaC ′−=                 (A10)
  
This means that, in equilibrium, a lobby contributes just enough to compensate for the 
reduction in social welfare brought about by its formation.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
 From equation (19) in the text, we can compare the net benefit of forming a 
lobby for an industry that has a loss ( LNB ) and an industry that has a gain ( GNB ): 
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The first line in the previous equation is positive. The term in brackets in that line 
corresponds to GBL – GBG, which is positive because the additional protection 
associated with becoming organized is larger for the sector that has a loss and also the 
increase in income brought about by protection has a larger impact on utility for a 
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sector that has a loss, due to loss aversion.95 It is multiplied by (1+ a) because the 
benefit of avoiding a loss also has a positive effect on social welfare and that tends to 
reduce the contribution that the lobby has to give to the government. The term in the 
second line in (A11) is positive provided that tariff revenue increases with the tariff, 
which also translates in a lower contribution. Finally, the term in the third line is 
negative because the decrease in consumer surplus when the sector that has a loss 
becomes organized is higher than for the other sector.96 This tends to increase the 
contribution that the industry must give to the government. Therefore, for a 
sufficiently high coefficient of loss aversion, the benefit of avoiding a loss (both for 
the industry and in terms of social welfare, since the latter affects the contribution), 
together with the tariff revenue effect, will dominate the last effect of a decrease in 
consumer surplus and we will have that GL NBNB > . From (A11) we obtain the 
condition for proposition 4 to hold: 
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In (A11) we assumed that the industry always gains with respect to the previous 
                                                 
95 This is also reinforced by the fact that profits are increasing and convex in the price, since the initial 
price (i.e. the price if the sector remains unorganized) is higher for the loser sector. 
 
96 This is because the increase in protection is higher and consumer surplus is decreasing and concave 
in price. 
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period when it is organized. If the industry that has a loss also loses when organized, 
the term ( )αLo∆Π  in (A7) is replaced with ( )βλ Lo∆Π− , and the condition for 
proposition 4 becomes: 
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Appendix B: Tables from Chapter 3 
 
 
Table 7: Political Organization Variable (I) 
 
                
 SIC4 DESCRIPTION  I  
    
PAC 
regression  
Probit 
regression  
                
        
 2032 Canned specialties  0  0  
 2033 Canned fruites and vegetables  0  0  
 2034 Dehydrated fruits, vegetables and soups  0  0  
 2035 Pickles, sauces and salad dressings  0  0  
 2037 Frozen fruits and vegetables  0  0  
 2041 Flour and other grain mill products  0  0  
 2043 Cereal breakfast foods  0  0  
 2044 Rice milling  0  0  
 2046 Wet corn milling  0  0  
 2047 Dog, cat, and other pet food  0  0  
 2048 Prepared feeds, n.e.c.  0  0  
 2074 Cottonseed oil mills  0  0  
 2076 Vegetable oil meals n.e.c.  0  0  
 2077 Animal and marine fats and oils  0  0  
 2082 Malt beverages  0  0  
 2084 Wines, brandy, and brandy spirits  0  0  
 2085 Distilled liquor, except brandy  0  0  
 2086 Bottled and canned soft drinks  0  0  
 2087 Flavoring extracts and syrups, n.e.c.  0  0  
 2091 Canned and cured seafoods  0  0  
 2095 Roasted coffee  0  0  
 2097 Manufactured Ice  0  0  
 2098 Macaroni and spaghetti  0  0  
 2099 Food preparations, n.e.c.  0  0  
 2211 Weaving mills, cotton  1  1  
 2221 Weaving mills, manmade fiber and silk  1  1  
 2231 Weaving and finishing mills, wool  1  1  
 2252 Hosiery, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2257 Circular knit fabric mills  1  1  
 2258 Warp knit fabric mills  1  1  
 2271 Woven carpets and rugs  1  1  
 2272 Tuftted carpets and rugs  1  1  
 2279 Carpets and rugs, n.e.c.  1  1  
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 2291 Felt goods, except woven felts and hats  1  1  
 2292 Lace goods  1  1  
 2294 Processed textile waste  1  1  
 2295 Coated fabrics, not rubberized  1  1  
 2296 Tire cord and fabric  1  1  
 2297 Nonwoven fabrics  1  1  
 2298 Cordage and twine  1  1  
 2299 Textile goods, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2311 Men's and boys' suits and coats  1  0  
 2331 Women's and misses' blouses  1  1  
 2337 Women's and misses' suits and coats  1  1  
 2341 Women's and children's underwear  1  0  
 2342 Brassieres and allied garments  1  0  
 2369 Children's outerwear, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2381 Fabric dree and work gloves  1  1  
 2384 Robes and dressing gowns  1  1  
 2385 Waterproof outer garments  1  1  
 2386 Leather and sheep line clothing  1  1  
 2387 Apparel belts  1  0  
 2389 Apparel and accessories, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2391 Curtains and draperies  1  0  
 2392 House furnishings, n.e.c.  1  0  
 2393 Textile bags  1  1  
 2397 Schiffli machine embroideries  1  1  
 2399 Fabricated textile products, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2411 Logging camps and logging contractors  1  1  
 2421 Sawmills and planing mills, general  1  1  
 2426 Hardwood dimension and flooring  1  1  
 2429 Special product sawmills, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2431 Millwork  1  1  
 2435 Hardwood veneer and plywood  1  1  
 2436 Softwood veneer and plywood  1  1  
 2439 Structural wood members, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2449 Wood containers, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2491 Wood preserving  1  1  
 2492 Particleboard  1  1  
 2499 Wood products, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2515 Mattresses and bedsprings  1  1  
 2517 Wood TV and radio cabinets  1  1  
 2621 Paper mills, except building paper  1  1  
 2631 Paperborad mills  1  1  
 2641 Paper coating and glazing  1  1  
 2642 Envelopes  1  1  
 2643 Bags, except textile bags  1  1  
 2646 Pressed and molded pulp goods  1  1  
 2647 Sanitary paper products  1  1  
 2649 Converted paper products  1  1  
 2651 Folding paperboard boxes  1  1  
 2654 Sanitary food containers  1  1  
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 2661 Building paper and board mills  1  1  
 2721 Periodicals  0  0  
 2731 Book publishing  0  1  
 2752 Commercial printing, lithographic  0  1  
 2754 Commercial printing, gravure  0  1  
 2782 Blankbooks and looseleaf binders  0  0  
 2821 Plastic materials and resins  1  1  
 2822 Synthetic rubber  1  1  
 2823 Cellulosic manmade fibers  1  1  
 2824 Organic fibers, noncellulosic  1  1  
 2831 Biological products  1  0  
 2833 Medicinals and botanicals  1  0  
 2834 Pharmaceutical preparations  1  0  
 2841 Soap and other detergents  1  0  
 2842 Polishes and sanitation goods  1  0  
 2843 Surface active agents  1  0  
 2844 Toilet preparations  1  0  
 2873 Nitrogenous fertilizers  1  1  
 2874 Phosphatic fertilizers  1  1  
 2879 Agricultural chemicals, n.e.c.  1  1  
 2911 Petroleum refining  0  1  
 3011 Tires and inner tubes  1  0  
 3021 Rubber and plastic footwear  1  0  
 3079 Miscellaneous plastic products  1  1  
 3111 Leather tanning and finishing  0  0  
 3131 Boot and shoe cut stock and findings  0  1  
 3142 House slippers  0  1  
 3143 Men's footwear, except athletic  0  0  
 3144 Women's footwear, except athletic  0  0  
 3149 Footwear, except rubber, n.e.c.  0  1  
 3171 Women's handbags and purses  0  1  
 3172 Personal leather goods, n.e.c.  0  0  
 3199 Leather goods, n.e.c.  0  1  
 3211 Flat glass  1  1  
 3221 Glass containers  1  1  
 3229 Pressed and blown glass, n.e.c.  1  1  
 3231 Products of purchased glass  1  1  
 3241 Cement, hydraulic  1  1  
 3251 Brick and structural clay tile  1  1  
 3253 Ceramic wall and floor tile  1  0  
 3255 Clay refractories  1  1  
 3259 Structural clay products, n.e.c.  1  1  
 3261 Vitreous plumbing fixtures  1  1  
 3262 Vitreous china food utensils  1  1  
 3263 Fine earthware food utensils  1  1  
 3264 Porcelain electrical supplies  1  1  
 3269 Pottery products, n.e.c.  1  1  
 3271 Concrete block and brick  1  1  
 3272 Concrete products, n.e.c.  1  1  
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 3273 Ready-mixed concrete  1  1  
 3274 Lime  1  1  
 3275 Gypsum products  1  1  
 3281 Cut stone and stone products  1  1  
 3291 Abrasive products  1  1  
 3292 Asbestos products  1  1  
 3296 Mineral wool  1  1  
 3297 Nonclay refractories  1  1  
 3299 Nonmetalic mineral products, n.e.c.  1  1  
 3312 Blast furnaces and stell mills  1  1  
 3313 Electrometallurgical products  1  1  
 3321 Gray iron foundries  1  1  
 3322 Malleable iron foundries  1  1  
 3331 Primary copper  1  1  
 3333 Primary zinc  1  1  
 3334 Primary aluminum  1  1  
 3351 Copper rolling and drawing  1  1  
 3353 Aluminium sheet, plate and foil  1  1  
 3354 Aluminium extruded products  1  1  
 3356 Nonferrous rolling and drawing, n.e.c.  1  1  
 3357 Nonferrous wire drawing and insulating  1  1  
 3421 Cutlery  0  0  
 3423 Hand and edge tools, n.e.c.  0  0  
 3425 Hand saws and saw blades  0  0  
 3429 Hardware, n.e.c.  0  0  
 3441 Fabricated structural metal  0  0  
 3443 Fabricated plate work (Boiler shops)  0  0  
 3462 Iron and steel forgings  0  1  
 3465 Automotive stampings  0  0  
 3466 Crowns and closures  0  1  
 3493 Steel springs, except wire  0  1  
 3494 Valves and pipe fittings  0  0  
 3496 Miscellaneous fabricated wire products  0  0  
 3497 Metal foil and leaf  0  0  
 3499 Fabricated metal products, n.e.c.  0  0  
 3511 Turbines and turbine generator sets  1  1  
 3519 Internal combustion engines, n.e.c.  1  1  
 3541 Machine tools, metal cutting types  1  0  
 3542 Machine tools, metal forming types  1  1  
 3544 Special dies, tools, jigs, and fixtures  1  1  
 3545 Machine tool accessories  1  0  
 3546 Power driven handtools  1  0  
 3547 Rolling mill machinery  1  0  
 3549 Metalworking machinery, n.e.c.  1  0  
 3551 Food products machinery  1  1  
 3552 Textile machinery  1  1  
 3553 Woodworking machinery  1  0  
 3554 Paper industries machinery  1  0  
 3555 Printing trades machinery  1  0  
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 3559 Special industry machinery, n.e.c.  1  0  
 3561 Pumps and pumping equipment  1  0  
 3562 Ball and roller bearings  1  1  
 3563 Air and gas compressors  1  0  
 3564 Blowers and fans  1  0  
 3565 Industrial patterns  1  1  
 3566 Speed changers, drives, and gears  1  1  
 3567 Industrial furnices and ovens  1  1  
 3568 Power transmission equipment, n.e.c.  1  1  
 3569 General industry machinery, n.e.c.  1  0  
 3574 Calculating and accounting machines  1  1  
 3576 Scales and balances, except laboratory  1  1  
 3579 Office machines, n.e.c., and typewriters  1  1  
 3581 Automatic merchandising machines  1  0  
 3585 Refrigeration and heating equipment  1  1  
 3586 Measuring and dispensing pumps  1  0  
 3612 Transformers  1  1  
 3613 Switchgear and switchboard apparatus  1  1  
 3621 Motors and generators  1  1  
 3623 Welding apparatus, electric  1  1  
 3624 Carbon and graphite products  1  1  
 3631 Household cooking equipment  1  0  
 3632 Household refrigerators and freezers  1  0  
 3635 Households vacuums cleaners  1  0  
 3636 Sewing machines  1  0  
 3639 Household appliances, n.e.c.  1  0  
 3641 Electric lamps  1  1  
 3643 Current-carrying wiring devices  1  1  
 3644 Non-current-carrying wiring devices  1  1  
 3648 Lighting equipment, n.e.c.  1  1  
 3651 Radio and TV receiving sets  1  1  
 3652 Phonograph records and prerecorded tape  1  1  
 3691 Storage batteries  1  1  
 3692 Primary batteries, dry and wet  1  1  
 3693 
X-ray, electromedical, and 
electrotherapeutic  1  1  
 3694 Engine elctrical equipment  1  1  
 3699 Electrical equipment and supplies, n.e.c.  1  1  
 3711 Motor vehicles and car bodies  0  0  
 3714 Motor vehicle parts and accessories  0  1  
 3721 Aircraft  0  1  
 3724 Aircraft engines and engine parts  0  1  
 3728 Aircraft equipment, n.e.c.  0  1  
 3743 Railroad equipment  0  1  
 3751 Motorcycles, bicycles, and parts  0  0  
 3824 Fluid meters and counting devices  0  1  
 3825 Instruments to measure electricity  0  0  
 3829 Measuring and controlling devices, n.e.c.  0  0  
 3832 Optical instruments and lenses  0  1  
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 3851 Ophtalmic goods  0  0  
 3861 Photographic equipment and supplies  0  1  
 3911 Jewerly, precious metals  0  0  
 3914 Silverware and plated ware  0  0  
 3915 Jewelers' materials and lapidary work  0  0  
 3931 Musical instruments  0  0  
 3942 Dolls  0  0  
 3944 Games, toys, and chidren's vehicles  0  0  
 3949 Sporting and athletic good, n.e.c.  0  0  
 3991 Brooms and brushes  0  0  
 3993 Signs and advertising displays  0  1  
 3996 Hard surface floor coverings  0  0  
 3999 Manufacturing industries, n.e.c.  0  0  
                
        
  Number of Industries with I = 1  164  149  
  Number of Observations  241  241  
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Table 8: NL2SLS Estimation (without setting βα = ) 
Parameter Value Std. Error 
β     0.818*** 0.065 
α    0.687** 0.296 
λ  2.285* 1.234 
a   0.025** 0.053 
R2 0.150 
Adj. R2 0.139 
Observations 241 
           *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
Table 9: 2SLS Estimation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Loss*(1-I)    234.144*** 51.674 
Gain*(1-I) 82.204** 35.604 
Loss*I   88.803*** 13.393 
Gain*I 42.302** 20.972 
I 3.142 73.640 
R2 0.149 
Adj. R2 0.134 
Prob(F-stat) 0.000 
Observations 241 
           *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%. 
             Loss= [ ] ( )ββ )1(1)1( −−− Π−Π× iiii ED , Gain= [ ] ( )ββ )1(1)1()1( −−−Π−Π×− iiii ED  
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Table 10: NL2SLS Estimation (I from Probit) 
Parameter Value Std. Error 
β  0.838*** 0.059 
λ  2.149*** 0.777 
a 0.021*** 0.007 
R2 0.182 
Adj. R2 0.175 
Observations 241 
           *** Significant at 1%. 
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